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Abstract
Since its inception, Article 9 has authorized both nonpossessory assignment of chattel paper perfected by the ling
of a nancing statement and a possessory assignment
perfected by possession. As a result, tangible chattel paper is
“quasi-negotiable” because certain purchasers for value with
possession can have priority over previously perfected secured
parties. The 2000 revision of Article 9 authorized security
agreements evidenced by an electronic record or records and
created electronic chattel paper as a new sub-type of collateral.
To extend quasi-negotiability to electronic chattel paper, it
also introduced the concept of “control” as an analogue to
possession of tangible chattel paper.
The initial denition of control required, in part, the existence of a “single authoritative copy” which is “unique.” Given
that an electronic record may be perfectly replicated, this definition created challenges for achieving this standard, but
the chattel paper nance industry has developed methods for
complying with this denition. Nevertheless, the requirement
for a single and unique authoritative copy is more stringent
than necessary for the purpose of the quasi-negotiability of
chattel paper and is more consistent with a possessory
analogue for electronic negotiable instruments and
documents. The 2010 revision to the denition of control
introduced a more exible standard that requires a system
that “reliably establishes” the secured party as the assignee.
This new denition will permit the development of methods
of control that are less complicated than current methods
and more consistent with the limited nature and purpose of
the quasi-negotiability of chattel paper. The new denition
may even permit the development of a system that eschews
the possessory analogue and that resembles the nonpossessory assignment of intangible receivables like accounts
and payment intangibles.
2
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Chattel Paper: Possession to Control
I.

Introduction

The 2000 revision to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code (the “UCC”), which has been enacted in all 50 states
and the District of Columbia,1 modernized the law of secured
transactions by authorizing the use of electronic records in
lieu of written records. An owner of a property item—the
“debtor”2—may create a security interest in favor of a secured
party3 in that property item by “authenticating” a security
agreement in the form of an electronic record.4 The debtor
and the secured party authorize the ling of electronic
nancing statements and nancing statement amendments
without a written signature.5 Chattel paper, which consists
of both a right to payment and a security interest in or a
1

See U.C.C. § 9-701 (2010). Revised Article 9 took eect on July 1,
2001, except in Connecticut (October 1, 2001), and in Florida, Mississippi,
and Alabama (January 1, 2002). See Unif. Commercial Code, 3 U.L.A. 14
to 18 (2002). In 2010, the Uniform Law Commission, formerly known as
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
adopted revisions to specic sections of Article 9, and these revisions were
enacted in all but six states (and the District of Columbia) eective on
July 1, 2013, and were subsequently enacted in California, Alabama,
Arizona, and Vermont, eective on or before July 1, 2014. Legislation to
enact these revisions has been introduced in the legislatures of New York
and Oklahoma. See Uniform Law Commission, UCC Article 9 Amendments (2010), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?titl
e=UCC Article 9 Amendments (2010) (last visited July 29, 2014).
2

See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(28) (2010) (providing that “debtor” means “(A)
a person having an interest, other than a security interest or other lien, in
the collateral, whether or not the person is an obligor; [or] (B) a seller of
accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes”).
3

See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(73) (providing that “secured party” means “(A)
a person in whose favor a security interest is created or provided for
under a security agreement, whether or not any obligation to be secured is
outstanding; [or] (D) a person to which accounts, chattel paper, payment
intangibles, or promissory notes have been sold”).
4

See U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(3)(A), quoted infra note 37; U.C.C. § 9102(a)(70) (dening “record” to mean “information that is inscribed on a
tangible medium or which is stored in an electronic or other medium and
is retrievable in perceivable form”); U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(7) (dening
“authenticate” to mean “(A) to sign; or (B) with present intent to adopt or
accept a record, to attach to or logically associate with the record an
electronic sound, symbol, or process”).
5

See U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. 4.h (“This Article is ‘medium-neutral’; that
is, it makes clear that parties may le and otherwise communicate with a
ling oce by means of records communicated and stored in media other
than on paper . . . . To facilitate electronic ling, this Article does not
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lease of specic goods, such as automobile and equipment
loans and leases, 6 now includes two new sub-types of
collateral: Tangible chattel paper evidenced by a writing,7
and electronic chattel paper “evidenced by a record or records consisting of information stored in an electronic
medium.”8 The use of electronic records in lieu of written records signicantly reduces the costs of secured transactions
for the purchase or leasing of specic goods arising from
copying, transmitting and storing written records.
Revised Article 9 also introduced the concept of “control”
of electronic chattel paper9 as an analogue to possession of
require that the debtor's signature or other authorization appear on a
nancing statement.”).
6

See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(11):
“Chattel paper” means a record or records that evidence both a monetary
obligation and a security interest in specic goods, a security interest in
specic goods and software used in the goods, a security interest in specic
goods and license of software used in the goods, a lease of specic goods,
or a lease of specic goods and license of software used in the goods. In
this paragraph, “monetary obligation” means a monetary obligation
secured by the goods or owed under a lease of the goods and includes a
monetary obligation with respect to software used in the goods.
7

See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(79) (dening “tangible chattel paper” to mean
“chattel paper evidenced by a record or records consisting of information
that is inscribed on a tangible medium”); U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(43) (2008)
(dening “written” to include “printing, typewriting, or any other
intentional reduction to tangible form”).
8

See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(31) (2010); U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. 4.d (“Electronic
chattel paper is a record or records consisting of information stored in an
electronic medium (i.e., it is not written).”).
9

See U.C.C. § 9-105 (2000):

A secured party has control of electronic chattel paper if the record or records comprising the chattel paper are created, stored, and assigned in such a
manner that:
(1) a single authoritative copy of the record or records exists which is
unique, identiable and, except as otherwise provided in paragraphs (4), (5),
and (6), unalterable;
(2) the authoritative copy identies the secured party as the assignee of
the record or records;
(3) the authoritative copy is communicated to and maintained by the
secured party or its designated custodian;
(4) copies or revisions that add or change an identied assignee of the authoritative copy can be made only with the participation of the secured party;
(5) each copy of the authoritative copy and any copy of a copy is readily
identiable as a copy that is not the authoritative copy; and

4
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Chattel Paper: Possession to Control
tangible chattel paper.10 Through this denition, Article 9 attempted to confer on electronic chattel paper the quasinegotiable status of tangible chattel paper which developed
before the drafting of Article 9 began in the late 1940s. As
discussed below,11 the quasi-negotiable status of tangible
chattel paper arises from (a) the ability of an originator of
the chattel paper to transfer rights in the chattel paper to a
“purchaser”12 without a written assignment and to perfect
such transfer without ling a nancing statement and, more
importantly, (b) the ability of the purchaser that acquires
possession to obtain priority, or super-priority, over an
earlier purchaser that had perfected its interest without taking possession. Article 9 extended this quasi-negotiability
both to secured lenders that take a security interest in chattel paper to secure a debt and to buyers of chattel paper.13
(6) any revision of the authoritative copy is readily identiable as an authorized or unauthorized revision.
10

See U.C.C. § 9-105 cmt. 2 (2010) (stating that “control of electronic
chattel paper is the functional equivalent of possession of ‘tangible chattel
paper’ ’’).
11

See infra notes 27-31 and 37-40 and accompanying text.

12

See U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(30) (2008) (dening “purchaser” as “a person
that takes by purchase”); U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(29) (dening “purchase” to
mean “taking by sale, lease, discount, negotiation, mortgage, pledge, lien,
security interest, issue or reissue, gift, or any other voluntary transaction
creating an interest in property”). A purchaser for value may be a “secured
party,” whether a secured lender or a buyer of accounts, chattel paper,
payment intangibles, or promissory notes, if the debtor has rights in the
collateral or the power to transfer rights and the debtor authenticates a
security agreement or the purchaser takes possession. See U.C.C. § 9203(b) (requirements for creating an enforceable security interest), quoted
infra note 37; U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(73) (denition of “secured party”), quoted
supra note 3.
13

See U.C.C. § 9-102(1) (1962) (providing that “this Article applies
. . . (b) to any sale of accounts . . . or chattel paper”).
Article 9 initially incorporated sales of these receivables through
misleading dened terms. See U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1962) (providing that a
“security interest” includes “any interest of a buyer of accounts or chattel
paper”); U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(d) (providing that ‘‘ ‘[d]ebtor’ . . . includes the
seller of accounts . . . or chattel paper”); U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(m) (providing
that ‘‘ ‘[s]ecured party’ means a lender, seller or other person in whose
favor there is a security interest, including a person to whom accounts
. . . or chattel paper have been sold”); U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(c) (providing that
‘‘ ‘[c]ollateral’ means the property subject to a security interest, and
includes accounts . . . and chattel paper which have been sold”).
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For interesting historical reasons, the drafters of Article 9
specically included sales of accounts and chattel paper in
Article 9 to subject such sales to the perfection and priority
rules that apply to security interests to secure a debt.14 The
2000 revision of Article 9 continued this coverage and also
expanded its coverage to include the sale of payment
intangibles and promissory notes.15
To confer this quasi-negotiable status on electronic chattel
paper, the original denition of control set forth in Section
9-105 of revised Article 9 attempted to replicate the function
of possession. This denition required at a minimum that
“the record or records comprising the chattel paper [be] created, stored, and assigned in such a manner that (1) a single
authoritative copy of the record or records exists which is
The use of these misleading dened terms led to signicant drafting
errors. See Plank, Sacred Cows and Workhorses: The Sale of Accounts and
Chattel Paper Under Article 9 of the U.C.C. and the Eects of Violating a
Fundamental Drafting Principle, 26 Conn. L. Rev. 397, 402–06, 442–493
(1994) (criticizing the use of misleading dened terms to incorporate the
sale of accounts and chattel paper under former Article 9 and describing
the many drafting errors in the pre-2000 revision Article 9 resulting from
such use) [hereinafter, Sale of Accounts and Chattel Paper under Former
Article 9].
14

See Plank, Sale of Accounts and Chattel Paper Under Former
Article 9, supra note 13, at 406-39 (describing the history of the drafting
of the original Article 9 and the inclusion of the sales of accounts and
chattel paper).
15

See U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(3) (2010) (providing that Article 9 applies to
“a sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory
notes”).
The 2000 revision continued the use of misleading dened terms to
incorporate these sales. See U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(35) (2008) (providing that
“security interest” means “an interest in personal property or xtures
which secures payment or performance of an obligation” and includes “any
interest of . . . a buyer of accounts, chattel paper, a payment intangible,
or a promissory note”); U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(28) (2010) (dening “debtor” to
include a seller of receivables), quoted supra note 2; U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(73)
(dening “secured party” to include a person to which receivables have
been sold), quoted supra note 3; U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(12) providing that
‘‘ ‘[c]ollateral’ means the property subject to a security interest . . . [and
includes] (B) accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory
notes that have been sold”). See Plank, Assignment of Receivables Under
Article 9: Structural Incoherence and Wasteful Filing, 68 Ohio St. L.J.
231, 234-47 (2007) (describing the revisions to Article 9 that xed some of
the drafting errors resulting from this methodology and the creation of
new drafting errors) [hereinafter, Assignment of Receivables: Structural
Incoherence].

6
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unique . . . [and with certain exceptions] unalterable.”16
This requirement presents challenges because of the dierence between the characteristics of a writing as an item of
property and the characteristics of an electronic record as an
item of property.
A single writing or a set of related writings signed by an
individual is by its very nature “unique” as is every other
tangible item of property. It cannot be altered except by
methods that change the tangible characteristics of the
writing. An electronic record, which consists of “information
. . . which is stored in an electronic or other medium and is
retrievable in perceivable form,”17 can be perfectly replicated
many times, and many types of electronic records can easily
be altered.18 Further, the transmission of an electronic record does not actually transfer an object in the same way that
transfer of possession of a tangible record transfers the physical thing from the transferor to the transferee. Instead, the
transmission of an electronic record creates a new record
held by the recipient and, depending on the method of transmission, may not eliminate the record held by the sender.19
Despite these challenges, the nancial industry has
developed systems and procedures that comply with the
stringent requirements for “control.” In addition, the 2010
revisions of Articled 9, which as of July 1, 2014, have been
enacted in all but two of the 50 states of the United States
16

See U.C.C. § 9-105 (2000), quoted supra note 9 (emphasis added).

17

See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(70) (2010) (dening “record”), quoted supra
note 4; U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(31) (dening “electronic chattel paper”), quoted
supra note 8.
18

See generally Working Group on Transferability of Electronic
Financial Assets, a Joint Working Group of the Committee on Cyberspace
Law and the Committee on the Uniform Commercial Code of the ABA
Section of Business Law and The Open Group Security Forum, Framework
for Control over Electronic Chattel Paper—Compliance with UCC § 9-105,
61 Bus. Law. 721, 722 (2006) (Matthias Hallendor & Mike Jerbic, reporters) (discussing the need to establish a control system in a control environment for electronic chattel paper).
19

See generally The ABA Cyberspace Committee Working Group on
Transferable Records, Emulating Documentary Tokens in an Electronic
Environment: Practical Models for Control and Priority of Interests in
Transferable Records and Electronic Chattel Paper, 59 Bus. Law. 379, 381
(2003), quoted in text accompanying note 98 infra.
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and the District of Columbia,20 introduced a more exible
denition for control and relegated the original denition of
“control” to a safe harbor. Specically, revised Section
9-105(a) states: “A secured party has control of electronic
chattel paper if a system employed for evidencing the
transfer of interests in the chattel paper reliably establishes the secured party as the person to which the chattel
paper was assigned.”21
This more exible denition will relax some requirements
that the nancial industry has developed to establish control
under the more stringent original denition. The implementation of the more exible standard may vary somewhat
depending on whether the electronic chattel paper consists
of an originally generated electronic record or is an electronic
record created by the conversion of a writing by a scanning
or imaging process.
The extent to which any system satises the legal denition of control should depend on the underlying purpose of
possession of tangible chattel paper. The next Part of this
article reviews the historical development of chattel paper
and the purpose of possession of tangible chattel paper. The
purpose of possession of tangible chattel paper is dierent
from, and more limited than, the purpose of possession of
negotiable instruments, which have a high degree of
20

See supra note 1.

21

See U.C.C. § 9-105(a) (2010) [emphasis added]. The original Section
9-105 became subsection (b) with minor changes as follows:
(b) A system satises subsection (a), and a secured party has control of
electronic chattel paper, if the record or records comprising the chattel paper
are created, stored, and assigned in such a manner that:
(1) a single authoritative copy of the record or records exists which is
unique, identiable, and, except as otherwise provided in paragraphs (4),
(5), and (6), unalterable;
(2) the authoritative copy identies the secured party as the assignee of
the record or records;
(3) the authoritative copy is communicated to and maintained by the
secured party or its designated custodian;
(4) copies or amendments that add or change an identied assignee of
the authoritative copy can be made only with the consent of the secured
party;
(5) each copy of the authoritative copy and any copy of a copy is readily
identiable as a copy that is not the authoritative copy; and
(6) any amendment of the authoritative copy is readily identiable as authorized or unauthorized.

8
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negotiability.22 The more limited purpose of possession of
tangible chattel paper informs the analysis of “control” of
electronic chattel paper.
The following Part then analyzes the methods by which
purchasers have achieved control under the strict requirements of original Section 9-105 and the safe harbor of revised
Section 9-105(b). This Part also shows how the original denition of control for electronic chattel paper and the current
safe harbor is more consistent with an electronic analogue
for possession of negotiable instruments than for possession
of tangible chattel paper. As a result, the original denition
of control for electronic chattel paper and the current safe
harbor is more restrictive than necessary to accomplish the
purposes of “control” of electronic chattel paper. This Part
also analyzes how the revised “reliably establishes” standard
will permit more exibility for obtaining control that is consistent with the purpose of providing the electronic analogue
of possession of tangible chattel paper. Because of the limited
purpose of possession of chattel paper, the “reliably establishes” standard for establishing control eliminates the
requirement that there be a “single” and “unique” authoritative copy of the electronic chattel paper. More importantly,
the “reliably establishes” standard may permit systems that
resemble the assignment of intangibles and not the transfer
of possession or some electronic analogue.
II. The Quasi Negotiable Status of Chattel Paper
Based on Possession
A. The Purpose of Possession
From the beginning, Article 9 included chattel paper—
which until 2001 could only be a writing—as a discrete type
of collateral to accommodate two dierent nancing practices that had developed in the rst half of the twentieth
century. Grant Gilmore described the term “chattel paper”
as a “novel term coined by the Code draftsmen to describe a
species of property which previously managed to exist
without a name.”23 This “species” included the conditional
sale contract or bailment lease used as security devices to
22

See infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.

23

See Grant Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 12.5
at 378 (1965) (Vol. 1) [hereinafter Gilmore, Security Interests].
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nance the purchase of goods.24 In one type of secured nancing, which Grant Gilmore called the automobile nancing
pattern, the dealer selling an item of goods under a conditional sale contract would transfer the contract to the
nancer, and the nancer would collect the amounts due.25
In the other type of secured nancing, such as nancing
household goods, the dealer would retain possession of the
contract and collect the contract but would assign the
contract to a nancing company as security for a loan.26
To accommodate both nancing models, the original version of Article 9 permitted (a) the creation of a security interest in chattel paper either by a written assignment agreement or by delivery of possession27 and (b) perfection of a
security interest either by ling a nancing statement28—a
choice not available to negotiable or non-negotiable instruments29—or by taking possession of the chattel paper.30 Further, to accommodate the possibility that a secured party
could have a perfected non-possessory security interest, Section 9-308 of the original Article 9 provided that a purchaser
with possession could have priority over a secured party
24

See Gilmore, Security Interests, supra note 23, § 12.5 at 378 (1965)
(Vol. 1); see also Gilmore, Security Interests, supra note 23, § 25.5 at 667
(Vol. II) (stating that the “most familiar illustration of ‘chattel paper’ is
the pre-Code conditional sale contract or bailment-lease”); Gilmore,
Security Interests, supra note 23, § 3.3 at 68–73 (Vol. I) (discussing
conditional sale as a security device); § 3.6 at 75–78 (Vol. I) and Gilmore,
Security Interests, supra note 23, § 3.1 at 62 n. 4 (Vol. I) (discussing the
bailment lease as similar to the conditional sale agreement as a security
device).
25

See U.C.C. § 9-308 cmt. 1 (1972); Gilmore, Security Interests, supra
note 23, § 25.5 at 668–69 (Vol. 2).
26

See supra note 25.

27

See U.C.C. § 9-203(1) (1962).

28

See U.C.C. § 9-304(1). An “instrument” includes both a negotiable
instrument under Article 3 and “any other writing which evidences a right
to the payment of money and is not itself a security agreement or lease
and is of a type which is in ordinary course of business transferred by
delivery with any necessary indorsement or assignment.” See U.C.C. § 9105(1)(i). See also U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(i) (1972) (same denition), and U.C.C.
§ 9-102(a)(47) (2010) (substantially same denition). However, under the
2000 revision of Article 9, a security interest in instruments may be
perfected by ling. See U.C.C. 9-312(a).
29

See U.C.C. § 9-304(1) (1962).

30

See U.C.C. § 9-305.
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Chattel Paper: Possession to Control
perfected other than by possession if certain conditions were
met.31
The nal Ocial Version of Article 9 of the initial UCC
was promulgated in 196232 and thereafter enacted in all 50
states and the District of Columbia.33 The drafters of Article
9 from the very beginning of the drafting process in 1948
included “chattel paper” as a distinct type of collateral.34 The
denition of chattel paper kept changing during the drafting
years, and in the rst few drafts chattel paper was included
in the denition of an instrument.35 The drafts also quickly
31

See U.C.C. § 9-308.

32

The 1962 Ocial Draft, reprinted in 23 Unif. Commercial Code
Drafts 381 (Elizabeth S. Kelly ed., 1984) [hereinafter, UCC Drafts].
33

See Unif. Commercial Code, 3 U.L.A. 1 to 3 (2002).

34

The term “chattel paper” rst appeared in Tentative Draft No. 1,
Article VII, Secured Commercial Transactions, Part III—Inventory
Financing, submitted for consideration at the annual meeting of the America Law Institute on May 20-21, 1948 in joint session with the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 4 UCC Drafts,
supra note 32, at 265. Section 2(1)(b) dened an “inventory lien” to include
“accounts and chattel paper” and Section 3(c) stated ‘‘ ‘Chattel paper’
means [not yet drafted].” 4 UCC Drafts, supra note 32, at 271, 272. The
notes and comments to the draft stated: ‘‘ ‘Chattel paper’ is the term
which will probably be used in characterizing the secured credit transactions arising on sale of durable inventory items such as electrical appliances and cars to the ultimate consumer.” 4 UCC Drafts, supra note 32, at
290. See also 25 A.L.I. Proc. Vol. II, at 190 (1948) (remarks of Allison
Dunham on the initial draft, Tentative Draft No. 1, 1948): “We use chattel
paper to cover both conditional sales and chattel mortgages that are used
to nance a consumer in his acquisition of his durable goods.”
35

See, e.g., U.C.C. § 7-104 (May 1949 Draft) (new denition: ‘‘ ‘chattel
paper’ includes installment obligation arising out of the sale or lease of
chattels, the payment of which is secured by rights in the chattels”), 8
UCC Drafts, supra note 32, at 82; U.C.C. § 8-106(1)(c), (d) (Sept. 1949
Revisions) (including chattel paper in the denition of instrument and
providing that chattel paper “means a writing which evidences a security
interest in or lease of goods, and which contains or secures a right to the
payment of money, if the writing is one customarily transferred by indorsement or delivery” and that “[w]here an instrument is secured by chattel
paper both writings together constitute the chattel paper”), 8 UCC Drafts,
supra note 32, at 294; U.C.C. § 8-106(3), (4) (Oct. 1949 Revisions)
(substantially same denitions of chattel paper, which is also included as
an instrument), 8 UCC Drafts, supra note 32, at 478–79; U.C.C. § 9105(1)(c), (g) (Proposed Final Draft, Spring 1950) (chattel paper “means a
writing of a type whose transfer customarily requires delivery and which
evidences a security interest in or lease of goods”; same language that if
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evolved to include the provisions for alternative possessory
and non-possessory creation and perfection of security
interests in chattel paper and for super-priority for a
purchaser of chattel paper for value with possession.36 Of
instrument is secured by chattel paper both writings constitute chattel
paper; chattel paper no longer included in denition of instrument), 9
UCC Drafts, supra note 32, at 413; U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(b) (Sept. 1950 Revisions) (same denitions except for adding “in ordinary course of business”
after “whose transfer”), 11 UCC Drafts, supra note 32, at 390; U.C.C. § 9105(1)(b) (Proposed Final Draft No. 2, Spring 1951) (chattel paper “means
a security agreement or lease of a type which is in the ordinary course of
business transferred by delivery”; minor changes with respect to combination of chattel paper and instrument as chattel paper), 12 UCC Drafts,
supra note 32, at 268; U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(b) (Final Nov. 1951) (same denition but adding “with appropriate indorsement or assignment” after
“delivery”), 13 UCC Drafts, supra note 32, at 66; U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(b)
(1952 Ocial Draft) (same), 15 UCC Drafts, supra note 32, at 195; U.C.C.
§ 9-105(1)(b) (1955 Supplement to 1952 Ocial Draft) (chattel paper
“means a writing which evidences either a security interest in or a lease
of specic consumer goods or specic equipment”; same language for
combination of chattel paper and instrument as chattel paper), 17 UCC
Drafts, supra note 32, at 380; U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(b) (1956 Recommendations of the Editorial Board for the UCC) (chattel paper “means a writing
or writings which evidence both a monetary obligation and a security
interest in or a lease of specic goods” and providing that when a transaction is evidenced both by a security agreement or lease and an instrument
both groups of writings constitute chattel paper), 18 UCC Drafts, supra
note 32, at 282; U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(b) (1957 Ocial Edition) (same; showing
changes from 1952 text and not from 1955 revision), 20 UCC Drafts,
supra note 32, at 135. Except for the addition of language excluding the
charter of a vessel from the denition, added between 1962 and 1972, the
denition remained the same until the 2000 revision of Article 9.
36

See, e.g., U.C.C. Art. VII, § 326 (Tentative Draft No. 2, Aug. 6, 1948)
(creation, perfection by possession or upon assignment, and priority for
good faith holder), 5 UCC Drafts, supra note 32, at 148; U.C.C. § 7-319
(May 1949 Draft) (creation, perfection by possession or upon assignment,
and priority for good faith holder), 8 UCC Drafts, supra note 32, at 125–
26.
These drafts had been organized by types of collateral, with each
part addressing security interests in dierent types of collateral (e.g., part
2-pledge, part 3-inventory and accounts receivable, part 4-equipment
nancing). After the May 1949 draft, the drafters reorganized the Article
in September 1949 so that dierent parts addressed dierent substantive
issues (e.g., part 2-creation, part 3-title creditors and purchasers, part
4-perfection and priority). The October 1949 draft further rened the organization structure to the structure of Article 9 in eect until the 2000
revision.
In addition, the provisions for chattel paper became more developed.
See, e.g. U.C.C. § 8-203(2) (Sept. 1949 Revisions) (assignment eective
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course, the current version of Article 9 continues these
upon delivery or written agreement), U.C.C. § 8-402(1)(d) (Alternative
A-automatic perfection, Alternative B-perfection by ling), U.C.C. § 8404(2) (perfection by possession through denition of instrument), 8 UCC
Drafts, supra note 32, at 310, 333, 339; U.C.C. § 8-204(1), (2) (Oct. 1949
Revisions) (attachment upon written assignment or possession), U.C.C.
§ 8-303 (perfection by ling), U.C.C. § 8-305 (perfection by possession
through the denition of instrument), U.C.C. § 8-308 (super-priority based
on good faith possession by assignee for value and either in ordinary
course of business or without knowledge of earlier security interest), 8
UCC Drafts, supra note 32, at 491, 504, 507–08, 513; U.C.C. § 9-204
(Proposed Final Draft, Spring 1950) (a writing or possession for attachment), U.C.C. § 9-302(1) (perfection by possession or ling), U.C.C. § 9-304
(automatic 10 day perfection for chattel paper), U.C.C. § 9-305(1) (perfection by possession of chattel paper), U.C.C. § 9-308(1)(b) (super-priority
over perfected assignee based on good faith possession for value, in
ordinary course of his business and without knowledge of earlier interest),
9 UCC Drafts, supra note 32, at 418, 425, 426–27, 429; U.C.C. § 9-204(1),
(2) (Sept. 1950 Revisions) (a writing or possession for attachment), U.C.C.
§ 9-302 (perfection by ling), U.C.C. § 9-304 (automatic 21 day perfection
for chattel paper), U.C.C. § 9-305(1) (perfection by possession), U.C.C. § 9308(1)(b), (2) (super-priority over perfected inventory lender in chattel
paper as proceeds based on good faith possession for value, in ordinary
course of his business and without knowledge of earlier interest, but
knowledge of security interest in inventory not such knowledge if no notation on chattel paper), 11 UCC Drafts, supra note 32, at 397, 405, 407–08,
410; U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(a), (b) (Proposed Final Draft No. 2, Spring 1951) (a
writing or possession for attachment), U.C.C. § 9-302 (perfection by ling),
U.C.C. § 9-304(1) (eliminating automatic 21 day perfection for chattel
paper), U.C.C. § 9-305(1) (perfection by possession), U.C.C. § 9-308
(purchaser for value and in ordinary course of his business who takes possession takes free of prior perfected security interest if chattel paper is
proceeds or if purchaser is without actual knowledge that chattel paper
has been assigned), 12 UCC Drafts, supra note 32, at 274, 281–82, 284–
86, 288; U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(a), (b) (Final Nov. 1951) and (1952 Ocial
Draft) (same for attachment), U.C.C. § 9-302(1) (perfection by ling),
U.C.C. § 9-305(1) (perfection by possession), U.C.C. § 9-308 (super-priority
over secured party perfected by ling for purchaser for new value and in
ordinary course of his business who takes possession without actual knowledge that specic chattel paper is subject to a security interest) [emphasis
added], 13 UCC Drafts, supra note 32, at 72, 79–80, 83, 86, and 15 UCC
Drafts, supra note 32, at 214, 233, 244, 257; U.C.C. § 9-305 (1956 Recommendations of the Editorial Board for the UCC) and (1957 Ocial Edition) (revision of provision on perfection by possession), U.C.C. § 9-308
(complete rewrite to give purchaser for new value who takes possession in
ordinary course of his business has priority over security interest perfected
by ling if without knowledge that specic chattel paper is subject to security interest [which priority also applied to non-negotiable instrument] or
if prior security interest is claimed merely as proceeds even if purchaser
has knowledge of prior security interest), 18 UCC Drafts, supra note 32,
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provisions: Either an authenticated security agreement or a
transfer of possession will support creation of the security
interest.37 A secured party may perfect its security interest
in tangible chattel paper by ling 38 or possession. 39 A
purchaser for value that takes possession may have superpriority over a secured party previously perfected by ling.40
at 303–04, 308–09, and 20 UCC Drafts, supra note 32, at 179, 188. The
latest versions of these sections became part of the 1962 ocial text. In
the 1972 revision of Article 9, Section 9-203 on attachment was revised
without substantive change as it related to chattel paper and Section 308
on super-priority was completely rewritten without substantive change
except to extend protection for chattel paper also to all instruments,
including instruments that were proceeds. See U.C.C. §§ 9-203, 9-308
(1972).
37

See U.C.C. § 9-203(b) (2010) [emphasis added]:

[With exceptions not relevant here] a security interest is enforceable against
the debtor and third parties with respect to the collateral only if:
(1) value has been given;
(2) the debtor has rights in the collateral or the power to transfer rights in
the collateral to a secured party; and
(3) one of the following conditions is met: (A) the debtor has authenticated
a security agreement that provides a description of the collateral . . . [or] (B)
the collateral is . . . in the possession of the secured party under Section
9-313 pursuant to the debtor's security agreement [or] (D) the collateral is
deposit accounts, electronic chattel paper, investment property, or letter-ofcredit rights, and the secured party has control under Section 9-104, 9-105,
9-106, or 9-107 pursuant to the debtor's security agreement.

Clauses (B) and (D) require that possession or control must be pursuant at least to an oral agreement.
38

See U.C.C. § 9-312(a) (providing that a “security interest in chattel
paper, negotiable documents, instruments, or investment property may be
perfected by ling”).
39

See U.C.C. § 9-313(a) (providing that “a secured party may perfect a
security interest in negotiable documents, goods, instruments, money, or
tangible chattel paper by taking possession of the collateral”).
40

See U.C.C. § 9-330 [emphasis added]:

(a) A purchaser of chattel paper has priority over a security interest in the
chattel paper which is claimed merely as proceeds of inventory subject to a
security interest if:
(1) in good faith and in the ordinary course of the purchaser's business,
the purchaser gives new value and takes possession of the chattel paper
or obtains control of the chattel paper under Section 9-105; and
(2) the chattel paper does not indicate that it has been assigned to an
identied assignee other than the purchaser.
(b) A purchaser of chattel paper has priority over a security interest in the
chattel paper which is claimed other than merely as proceeds of inventory
subject to a security interest if the purchaser gives new value and takes
possession of the chattel paper or obtains control of the chattel paper
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These provisions recognized and codied the limited negotiability of chattel paper. In contrast, negotiable instruments
have a robust form of negotiability, surpassed perhaps only
by the negotiability of money. This robust form of negotiability includes the following elements:
(1) a person in possession may transfer the right to
enforce the right to payment by transferring possession of
the writing;41
(2) a person with the rights of a holder in due course
takes the instrument free of any claims to the instrument;42
under Section 9-105 in good faith, in the ordinary course of the purchaser's
business, and without knowledge that the purchase violates the rights of the
secured party.

The knowledge requirement for super-priority for chattel paper
claims merely as proceeds, that is, the absence of a notation on the chattel
paper, is less stringent than for other transactions, which requires that
purchaser be “without knowledge that the purchase violates the rights” of
the prior assignee.
41

See U.C.C. § 3-201(a) (1990) (stating that ‘‘ ‘Negotiation’ means a
transfer of possession, whether voluntary or involuntary, of an instrument
by a person other than the issuer to a person who thereby becomes its
holder.”); U.C.C. § 3-301 (dening a “person entitled to enforce” as “(i) the
holder of the instrument, (ii) a nonholder in possession of the instrument
who has the rights of a holder, or (iii) a person not in possession” with the
right to enforce a lost or stolen instrument); U.C.C. §§ 3-412, 3-413,
3-414(b), 3-415(a) (obligations of makers, acceptors, drawers, and indorsers owed to person entitled to enforce instrument). The Uniform Law
Commission approved revisions to Article 3 in 2002, but as of July 1,
2014, those revisions have been adopted in only 12 states. See Uniform
Law Commission, UCC Article 3, Negotiable Instruments and Article 4,
Bank Deposits (2002), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?t
itle=UCC Article 3, Negotiable Instruments and Article 4, Bank Deposits
(2002) (last visited July 29, 2014). The 1990 revision of Article 3 remains
in eect in most of the states (but not New York, which still uses the 1962
version of Article 3 with some modications), and for this reason, this
Article cites the 1990 revision of Article 3.
The 2000 revision to Article 9 expanded the coverage to include the
sale of promissory notes. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. An
owner of a note can sell the note by signing a sale agreement, see U.C.C.
§ 9-203(b)(3)(A) (2010), quoted supra note 37, and a sale of a promissory
note is perfected automatically, U.C.C. § 9-309(4). Accordingly, an owner
can transfer a perfected ownership interest in a promissory note without
transferring possession. Nevertheless, transferring the right to enforce the
note under Article 3 requires transferring possession.
42

See U.C.C. § 3-306 (1990):
A person taking an instrument, other than a person having rights of a
holder in due course, is subject to a claim of a property or possessory right
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(3) the right of a holder in due course is not subject to
any defenses (other than certain “real” defenses) or claims in
recoupment against a party other than the holder;43
(4) a holder takes free of any claim in recoupment that
arises out of a transaction other than the transaction that
gave rise to the instrument;44 and
(5) payment by the obligor to a person that is not the
holder of the instrument or a nonholder in possession with
the rights of a holder (except in the case of a lost note) does
not discharge the obligation against a holder in due course.45
A transfer of possession of tangible chattel paper does not
confer most of the benets of this negotiability. An assignee
receives only the rst two of these benets. As noted above,
transfer of possession is sucient to create and perfect the
transferee's interest.46 More importantly, transfer of possession can give the assignee super-priority over a prior
in the instrument or its proceeds, including a claim to rescind a negotiation and to recover the instrument or its proceeds. A person having rights
of a holder in due course takes free of the claim to the instrument.
43

See U.C.C. § 3-305:
(a) Except as stated in subsection (b), the right to enforce the obligation of a party to pay an instrument is subject to the following (1)
[certain “real” defenses, such as infancy], (2) a defense of the obligor
stated in another section of this Article or a defense of the obligor that
would be available if the person entitled to enforce the instrument were
enforcing a right to payment under a simple contract; and (3) a claim in
recoupment of the obligor against the original payee of the instrument if
the claim arose from the transaction that gave rise to the instrument.
(b) The right of a holder in due course to enforce the obligation of a
party to pay the instrument is subject to defenses of the obligor stated
in subsection (a)(1), but is not subject to defenses of the obligor stated in
subsection (a)(2) or claims in recoupment stated in subsection (a)(3)
against a person other than the holder.
44
See U.C.C. § 3-305(a)(3), quoted supra note 43.
45

See U.C.C. § 3-602(a) (providing that “an instrument is paid to the
extent payment is made (i) by or on behalf of a party obliged to pay the
instrument, and (ii) to a person entitled to enforce the instrument”); U.C.C.
§ 3-301 (dening a “person entitled to enforce”), quoted supra note 41;
U.C.C. § 3-601(a) (providing that the “obligation of a party to pay the
instrument is discharged . . . by an act or agreement with the party
which would discharge an obligation to pay money under a simple
contract”); U.C.C. § 3-601(b) (stating that “[d]ischarge of the obligation of
a party is not eective against a person acquiring rights of a holder in due
course of the instrument without notice of the discharge”).
46

See U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(3)(B) (2010) (creation), quoted supra note 37;
U.C.C. § 9-313(a) (perfection by possession), quoted supra note 39.
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perfected assignee.47 These benets protect the assignee
against the claims of the assignor or those who have a claim
to the chattel paper through the assignor in ways that assignees of ordinary rights to payment, such accounts or payment intangibles, do not.
For example, a security interest in accounts and payment
intangibles requires an authenticated security agreement.48
Filing a nancing statement is necessary to perfect a security interest in accounts (including as noted above49 a buyer's
interest in accounts) and a security interest in payment
intangibles to secure a debt.50 Generally, the rst assignee to
le a nancing statement will have priority.51 No assignee
47

See U.C.C. § 9-330(a), (b), quoted supra note 40.

48

See U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(3)(A), quoted supra note 37 (requiring an
authenticated security agreement describing the collateral).
49

See U.C.C. § 1-102(b)(35) (2008), quoted supra note 15 (dening “security interest” to include the interest of a buyer of accounts, chattel
paper, a payment intangible, or a promissory note).
50

See U.C.C. § 9-310(a) (2010) (requiring ling to perfect security
interests other than those excepted by subsection (b)). Possession is not a
permissible method of perfection because accounts and payment intangibles are intangible. See U.C.C. § 9-313(a). A sale of payment intangibles,
however, is perfected upon attachment. U.C.C. § 9-309(3).
51

See U.C.C. § 9-322(a):

Except as otherwise provided in this section, priority among conicting security interests and agricultural liens in the same collateral is determined according to the following rules:
(1) Conicting perfected security interests and agricultural liens rank according to priority in time of ling or perfection. Priority dates from the
earlier of the time a ling covering the collateral is rst made or the security
interest or agricultural lien is rst perfected, if there is no period thereafter
when there is neither ling nor perfection.
(2) A perfected security interest or agricultural lien has priority over a
conicting unperfected security interest or agricultural lien.
(3) The rst security interest or agricultural lien to attach or become eective has priority if conicting security interests and agricultural liens are
unperfected.

I use the word “generally” because, except in the case of a sale of
payment intangibles, ling is necessary to perfect a security interest in accounts or payment intangibles. U.C.C. § 9-310(a). Accordingly, the rst to
le or perfect rule of section 9-322(a)(1) and the perfected over unperfected
rule of 9-322(a)(1), see supra, is really a rst to le rule. Because a sale of
payment intangibles, however, is perfected upon attachment, U.C.C. § 9309(3), there is a debate about whether a buyer of payment intangibles
may obtain priority based on a ling made before its interest is perfected.
See Harris and Mooney, Jr., Using First Principles of UCC Article 9 to
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that is the second to le may obtain super-priority over a
perfected assignee that had led rst.
None of the quasi-negotiable provisions for chattel paper,
however, give the assignee of chattel paper any advantages
over other assignees of ordinary rights to payment against
the obligors on the chattel paper that holders of negotiable
instruments can obtain. Like assignees of accounts, payment
intangibles and other general intangibles, the assignee of
chattel paper takes subject to all defenses and claims in
recoupment of the obligor (called the “account debtor”) that
arise from the transaction that gave rise to the chattel
paper.52 The assignee also takes subject to any other defense
or claim of the obligor against the assignor which accrues
before the obligor receives notication of the assignment.53
Payment by the obligor to the assignor will discharge the
payment obligation unless the obligor receives notication of
the assignment to the assignee.54
Almost from the beginning of the drafting, the drafters
incorporated these limitations to the negotiability of tangible
chattel paper. Although Homer Kripke argued in 1950 that
as a matter of public policy a third party providing credit
pursuant to chattel paper should have holder in due course
Solve Statutory Puzzles in Receivables Financing, 46 Gonz. L. Rev. 297,
311–18 (2011) (arguing why ling should provide priority for a buyer of
payment intangibles); Plank, Article 9 of the UCC: Reconciling Fundamental
Property Principles and Plain Language, 68 Bus. Law. 439, 497–99 (2013)
(agreeing with Professors Harris and Mooney on this point).
52

See U.C.C. § 9-404(a) (2010) (providing that “the rights of an assignee are subject to: (1) all terms of the agreement between the account
debtor and assignor and any defense or claim in recoupment arising from
the transaction that gave rise to the contract; and (2) any other defense or
claim of the account debtor against the assignor which accrues before the
account debtor receives a notication of the assignment authenticated by
the assignor or the assignee”). The “account debtor” is the “person obligated on an account, chattel paper, or general intangible.” See U.C.C. § 9102(a)(3).
53

See U.C.C. § 9-404, discussed supra note 52.

54

See U.C.C. § 9-406(a) (providing that “an account debtor on an account, chattel paper, or a payment intangible may discharge its obligation
by paying the assignor until, but not after, the account debtor receives a
notication, authenticated by the assignor or the assignee, that the
amount due or to become due has been assigned and that payment is to be
made to the assignee. After receipt of the notication, the account debtor
may discharge its obligation by paying the assignee and may not discharge the obligation by paying the assignor.”).
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status,55 the drafters subjected the holders of the chattel
paper to the defenses and claims of the obligors,56 including
discharge of the obligor's payment obligation by payment to
an assignor before receipt of notication of assignment.57 The
denition of chattel paper further provided that, even if the
monetary obligation was evidenced by a note that was a negotiable instrument, the combination of the note and the security agreement securing the note constituted chattel
paper.58
Therefore, possession of tangible chattel paper does not
improve the assignee's rights against the obligor, whereas
possession of a negotiable instrument not only can give the
holder extra protections against the prior holder but also can
give the holder extra protections against the obligor on the
instrument. These expanded protections derive from the par55

See Kripke, Chattel Paper as a Negotiable Specialty Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 59 Yale L.J. 1209, 1222 (1950).
56

See U.C.C. Art. VII, § 318(2) (Tentative Draft No. 2, Aug. 6, 1948)
(accounts only, by virtue of denition of “account debtor” in § 303(5) as
obligor on an account), 5 UCC Drafts, supra note 32, at 135, 142–43;
U.C.C. § 7-315(2) (May 1949 Draft) (through expanded denition of “account debtor” in § 7-303(4) to include obligor on chattel paper), 8 UCC
Drafts, supra note 32, at 110, 122; U.C.C. § 8-306(2) (Sept. 1949 Revisions) (same through denition of “account debtor” in § 8-104(1)(a)), 8
UCC Drafts, supra note 32, at 289, 327; U.C.C. § 8-315(2) (Oct. 1949 Revisions) (same, through denition of “account debtor” in § 8-104(b)), 8 UCC
Drafts, supra note 32, at 474, 527; U.C.C. § 9-317(1) (Proposed Final
Draft, Spring 1950) (same with minor changes, through denition of “account debtor” in § 9-105(1)(a)), 9 UCC Drafts, supra note 32, at 413, 434;
U.C.C. § 9-319(1) (Sept. 1950 Revisions) (same), 11 UCC Drafts, supra
note 32, at 390, 417; U.C.C. § 9-318(1) (Proposed Final Draft No. 2, Spring
1951) (same with minor changes), 12 UCC Drafts, supra note 32, at 295.
This provision thereafter remained the same until the 2000 revision of
Article 9. See U.C.C. § 9-318(1) (1952 Ocial Draft), 15 UCC Drafts, supra
note 32, at 273; U.C.C. § 9-318(1) (1957 Ocial Edition), 20 UCC Drafts,
supra note 32, at 205 and U.C.C. § 9-318(1) (1962) and (1972).
57

See U.C.C. § 9-317(2) (Proposed Final Draft, Spring 1950), 9 UCC
Drafts, supra note 32, at 434; U.C.C. § 9-319(2) (Sept. 1950 Revisions)
(same with minor changes), 11 UCC Drafts, supra note 32, at 417–18;
U.C.C. § 9-318(3) (Proposed Final Draft No. 2, Spring 1951) (same with
minor changes), 12 UCC Drafts, supra note 32, at 296. This provision
thereafter remained the same until the 2000 revision of Article 9. See
U.C.C. § 9-318(3) (1952 Ocial Draft), 15 UCC Drafts, supra note 32, at
273-74; U.C.C. § 9-318(3) (1957 Ocial Edition), 20 UCC Drafts, supra
note 32, at 205 and U.C.C. § 9-318(3) (1962) and (1972).
58

See UCC sections cited supra note 35.
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ticular rules governing negotiable instruments that give to
the concept of “possession” a dierent meaning than the
concept of possession of tangible chattel paper.
B. Illustration of Distinct Roles of Possession
Two circumstances illustrate the dierences in the purpose
and importance of possession. One circumstance is the eect
of payment to discharge an obligation, and the other is the
eect of multiple duplicate originals that bear an original
“wet ink” signature. To explore these circumstances, assume
two similar transactions, T1 and T2. In T1, a customer O1
buys an item of property from S1 for $100 or borrows $100
from S1, and O1 issues to S1 a negotiable promissory note in
the amount of $100. In T2, a customer O2 buys a specic
good for $100 in exchange for tangible chattel paper, that is,
the customer signs a written agreement promising to pay to
the seller S2 the $100 and granting a security interest in the
good to secure the promise to pay. Assume further that at
some point, each of S1 and S2 transfer possession of the note
and the chattel paper to a purchaser for value, respectively,
P1 and P2 (or more than one purchaser for value), and that
neither obligor O1 or O2 is notied of this transfer.
1. Payment of the Obligation
In T1, O1 pays S1 the $100 to discharge O1's obligation
under the promissory note. In this case, O1 should demand
possession of the note, or O1 should ensure that the note is
physically marked to show payment.59 In this case, possession of the note or a marking of the note is critical to protect
O1. So long as S1 retains possession of the note that is not
marked “paid,” S1 can transfer the note to a bona de
purchaser P1 for value without notice of any payment who
qualies as a holder in due course. If P1 then demands payment from O1, O1 must pay a second time. O1's payment to
S1 does not discharge O1's obligation to pay the note to P1.60
O1 can avoid this result only by regaining possession of the
note, which would prevent a subsequent transfer, or by
59

See U.C.C § 3-501(b)(2) (1990):

Upon demand of the person to whom presentment is made, the person making presentment must (i) exhibit the instrument, (ii) give reasonable identication and, if presentment is made on behalf of another person, reasonable evidence of authority to do so, and (iii) sign a receipt on the instrument for any
payment made or surrender the instrument if full payment is made.
60

See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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ensuring that the note carries a notation that it has been
paid, which notation would ensure that no subsequent holder
can acquire it without notice of the payment.
In T2, however, if on the due date O2 pays the $100 owed
under the chattel paper to S2 before O2 receives notication
of the transfer of the chattel paper to P2, O2's payment will
discharge the $100 obligation.61 Whether S2 or P2 has possession of the tangible chattel paper is irrelevant to O2's liability on the chattel paper. O2's liability depends upon
notication of assignment.
2. Multiple Originals
In T1, O1 would not normally sign more than one original
note and, for reasons that will become apparent, should not
sign more than one original note. In T2, it has been fairly
common practice for O2 to sign multiple identical copies of
the tangible chattel paper.62
Assume that both O1 and O2 sign duplicate original
documents. In T1, by signing two notes promising to pay
$100, O1 will have in fact incurred two obligations for $100.
Now, if S1 retains the two notes and demands payment of
both notes, O1 will have a defense to payment of the second
note—lack of consideration.63 However, if S1 has transferred
one originally signed copy of the note to P1-A who becomes a
holder in due course and the other originally signed copy of
the note to another purchaser P1-B who becomes a holder in
due course, and both P1-A and P1-B demand payment, O1
must pay both.64 O1's defense of lack of consideration for the
obligation under the second note (whether held by P1-A or
P1-B) will not be eective against either P1-A or P1-B.65
In T2, however, signing two original copies of the chattel
paper will not create two obligations by O2. By such signing,
O2 will have incurred only one obligation for $100. If S2 has
61

See supra note 54 and accompanying text.

62

See, e.g., sources cited infra in notes 68, 69 & 77 and accompanying

text.
63

See U.C.C. § 3-303(b) (1990) (providing that the “drawer or maker
of an instrument has a defense if the instrument is issued without
consideration”); U.C.C. § 3-305(a)(2) (providing that “the right to enforce
the obligation of a party to pay an instrument is subject . . . a defense of
the obligor stated in another section of this Article”).
64

See supra note 43 and accompanying text.

65

See sources cited supra note 63.
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transferred one originally signed writing to P2-A and the
other originally signed writing to another purchaser P2-B,
O2 is entitled to pay S2 until O2 receives notication of any
assignment. If O2 receives notication from either P2-A or
P2-B, O2 can pay the $100 owed under the chattel paper to
the person from whom it rst receives notication of
assignment. Such payment would discharge O2's obligation
under the chattel paper. The other assignee will have taken
subject to O2's defense of payment of the obligation. Further, O2 will have a defense of lack of consideration for more
than one obligation under the writing which will be eective
against either P2-A or P2-B.
C. What is Possession?
The foregoing examples illustrate the dierences in the
meaning of possession for negotiable instruments and chattel paper. If multiple originally signed copies of a written
note exist, whoever has possession of each written note bearing an original signature has possession of the note. If
multiple originally signed copies of tangible chattel paper
exist, and one person has possession of all originally signed
written chattel paper, that one person would have “possession” of “the” chattel paper. But, if multiple originally signed
copies of tangible chattel paper exist, and dierent persons
have possession of an originally signed written chattel paper,
does any person have “possession” of “the” chattel paper for
purposes of perfection or super-priority?
The quasi-negotiability of tangible chattel paper suggests
that, if more than one person has possession of an originally
signed tangible chattel paper, no person has possession of
“the” chattel paper. As between the debtor and a secured
party, the transfer of possession of the chattel paper is sufcient to create and perfect a security interest if possession
by the secured party imparts notice to the world that the
debtor no longer has the ability to assign its interest to
another. If both the debtor and the secured party each have
possession of an originally signed chattel paper, however,
possession by the secured party of one original does not serve
this notice function. The secured party's possession does not
deprive the debtor of its ability, derived from its possession
of an original written chattel paper, to mislead its creditors
and subsequent purchasers about the extent of its interests
22 © 2014 Thomson Reuters E UCC Law Journal E Vol. 46September 2014

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2561891

Chattel Paper: Possession to Control
in the chattel paper. 66 If in the T2 example above, S2
transferred possession of one originally signed chattel paper
to P2-A, but retained the other originally signed chattel
paper, S2 appears to own the chattel paper unencumbered
and also retains the power to transfer that original chattel
paper to another purchaser. The situation combines the classic “ostensible ownership” problem and the potential fraud
problem that has plagued personal property security law for
centuries, only for tangible chattel paper instead of sheep.67
Treating the possession of each original by the debtor and
the secured party as “possession” would defeat the purpose
of permitting perfection by possession. The court in Funding
Systems Asset Management Corp. v. Chemical Business
Credit Corp. (In re Funding Systems Asset Management
Corp.)68 agreed. In this case, the originator of tangible chattel paper, as a matter of routine, caused the lessee/obligor to
sign three originals of a master lease, a lease schedule that
contained the specic terms of the tangible chattel paper,
and in some cases an assignment agreement. These originals
were distributed in a variety of ways. This case involved 12
such leases pledged to a secured lender. The secured lender
had failed to perfect its security interest by ling a nancing
statement because it led the nancing statement in the
wrong ling oce. Nevertheless, the secured lender had possession of each of the 12 originally executed lease schedules.
For nine of the leases, however, the debtor also had possession of the originally executed schedules. For the other three
66

See Gilmore, Security Interests, supra note 23, § 14.1 at 438 (Vol.

1).
67

See Gilmore, Security Interests, supra note 23, § 2.1 at 64 n.1 (Vol.
1) (summarizing Twyne's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber 1601), in
which the debtor Pierce had deeded sheep to his creditor Twyne in satisfaction of a debt but retained possession of and control over the sheep; the
transfer was deemed to be fraudulent because Pierce's continued possession and trading of the sheep deceived his creditors); Mooney, Jr., The
Mystery and Myth of “Ostensible Ownership” and Article 9 Filing: A
Critique of Proposals to Extend Filing Requirements to Leases, 39 Ala. L.
Rev. 683, 725–43 (1988) (examining the doctrine of “ostensible ownership”
and noting that courts and commentators have failed to distinguish a
concern about ostensible ownership from a concern about fraud on the
part of debtors and some secured creditors).
68

In re Funding Systems Asset Management Corp., 111 B.R. 500, 11
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 205 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990).
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leases, the debtor had possession of only a copy of the
schedules.
The court held that the lender was perfected by possession
in the three leases for which the debtor had only a copy but
was not perfected in the nine leases in which the debtor had
a duplicate original.69 The court reasoned that the lender
had absolute dominion and control over the three leases
because its possession of the original schedules and the debtor's possession of only a copy deprived the debtor of the
ability to mislead others that it was free to pledge the three
leases. On the other hand, the lender failed to exercise
absolute dominion and control over all available originals for
the nine leases for which the debtor had possession of origi69

The Colorado Court of Appeals in Denver Tec Bank v. F.D.I.C., 843
P.2d 129, 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 595 (Colo. App. 1992) cited Funding
Systems Asset Management Corp. in a priority dispute between two banks
that claimed a security interest in the same leases perfected by ling, although the court reached the wrong result in awarding priority to the rst
bank to le a nancing statement because that bank's debtor had failed to
acquire a perfected security interest in the leases. In this case, Municipal
Investor Service, Inc. (“MIS”) had acquired all of the originally signed copies of two equipment leases from the initial lessor. MIS then assigned its
interests in the leases to its vice president, John Terborg, and delivered
one set of originally signed copies of the two equipment leases to Terborg.
Terborg granted a security interest in the leases to Cherry Creek National
Bank (“CCNB”), for which the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (“FDIC”)
was later appointed as receiver, which security interest CCNB perfected
by ling. MIS later granted a security interest to the predecessor of Denver
Tec Bank, which was also perfected by a later led nancing statement.
The parties did not dispute the trial court's determination that,
because MIS retained one set of the originally signed equipment leases, a
security interest in the leases could not be perfected by possession and
could only be perfected by ling. Denver Tec Bank v. F.D.I.C., 843 P.2d at
132. The court then held that the FDIC as successor to CCNB, which was
the rst ler, had priority over Denver Tec Bank. The court did address
the fact that Terborg was a dierent debtor than MIS, but rejected the
plainti's assertion that FDIC has no security interest because Terborg
did not le a nancing statement: “The UCC does not require an owner of
collateral to perfect his or her ownership interest by ling such a document.” Denver Tec Bank v. F.D.I.C., 843 P.2d at 133. This statement is
wrong because Article 9 from the beginning had required buyers of chattel
paper to perfect their interests by ling or possession. See supra notes
13–15 and accompanying text. Because Terborg's security interest, which
was an ownership interest, was not perfected, Denver Ten Bank's security
interest had priority over Terborg's security interest. Therefore the FDIC's
interest, derived from Terborg's subordinate interest, was likewise subordinate to Denver Ten Bank.
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nal lease schedules because the debtor's possession of the
original schedules would allow the debtor to mislead others
that it was free to pledge the nine leases.70
Funding Systems addressed one aspect of the quasinegotiability of tangible chattel paper—perfection by
possession. The more important aspect is super-priority. As
between conicting security interests, transfer of possession
confers super-priority to the possessor over other security
interests. However, if more than one person has possession
of originally signed copies of chattel paper, neither person
will be entitled to priority based on possession.
This result follows from the language of Section 9-330(a)
and (b). Under these two subsections (one dealing with chattel paper that is proceeds of inventory subject to a security
interest and the other dealing with all other chattel paper),
a bona de purchaser for value that takes “possession” of
“the” chattel paper may have priority over a prior perfected
non-possessory security interest. This rule works, however,
only if one person has possession of all originals. If in the T2
example above S2 transferred possession of one originally
signed chattel paper to P2-A in a way that would otherwise
give P2-A priority under Section 9-330, but retained the
other originally signed chattel paper, S2 retains the power
to transfer that original chattel paper to P2-B in a way that
would convince P2-B that P2-B would have priority. If S2
70

111 B. R. at 516–19. This case can be contrasted with Glosser v. Colonial Pacic Leasing Co. (In re Equitable Financial Management, Inc.,
164 B.R. 53, 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 1152 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1994)), in
which the bankruptcy trustee attempted to avoid a secured lender's security interest in two equipment leases (which constitute chattel paper) on
the grounds that the secured lender had not perfected its interest. Specically, the trustee argue that, although the secured lender had possession
of all of the originally executed documents constituting the lease agreement, the secured lender was not perfected by possession because the
debtor also had possession of originally signed lease documents. The court
rejected the trustee's avoidance action because the debtor had possession
of only preliminary and incomplete documents, and possession of equipment schedules that were part of the lease that were only copies not
containing the original signature of the lessee as obligor. The court stated:
“The equipment schedules debtor possessed were only photocopies of the
originals CPL [the secured lender] possessed. As such, they have no more
binding legal eect than would a photocopy of, say, a ten dollar bill. No
reasonably prudent purchaser of chattel paper would have accepted the
photocopied equipment schedules as original equipment schedules
constituting a portion of the lease agreements.” In re Equitable Financial
Management, Inc., 164 B.R. at 57.
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transferred possession of one originally signed chattel paper
to P2-B in a way that would otherwise give P2-B priority
under Section 9-330, P2-B should not acquire priority
notwithstanding its possession of the original.
If possession of an original, but not all originals, is not
“possession” for perfection under 9-313 and is also not possession under 9-330, Section 9-330 would not apply and the
normal priority rules would apply. Between the competing
purchasers, P2-A and P2-B, the purchaser that was the rst
to le (if both had led nancing statements or if only one
had led a nancing statement and the other was unperfected) or the rst to attach (if neither had led nancing
statements) would prevail.71
On the other hand, even if possession of each original by
each purchaser were “possession” within the meaning of
9-330(a) and (b), then each of P2-A and P2-B could have
priority over the other, which is to say that neither would
priority over the other. Accordingly, the other priority rules
would apply, unless a court were to hold that, if both qualied for priority under Section 9-330, each was entitled to a
pro-rata share of the chattel paper. Hence, to accomplish the
purpose of super-priority, the purchaser must have all copies
of the originally signed tangible chattel paper.
D. The Limited Purpose of Super-Priority
The analysis of the requirements for possession (and
therefore of the requirements for control as an analogue to
possession in the following Part) requires an understanding
of the limited reason for providing super-priority to a
purchaser of chattel paper. The super-priority for such
purchasers is essential for the ecient operation of the current “indirect” origination business model for chattel paper.
For example, the vast majority of automobile loan originations follow the indirect origination model. 7 2 Finance
companies purchase automobile loans from automobile dealers that originate the loans on the forms of the nance
companies and in compliance with the underwriting and
71

See U.C.C. § 9-322(a) (2010), quoted supra note 51.

72

Standard & Poor's Rating Services, ABS: General Methodology and
Assumptions for Rating U.S. Auto Loan Securitizations, ¶ 13 (Jan. 11,
2011, republished Jan. 5, 2012) (“Most auto nancings are indirect auto
loans, which means that the auto dealer helped to secure nancing for the
buyer.”).
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other criteria determined by the nance companies. Each
dealer is thus the initial originator, but the purchasing
nance company is also known in the industry as an
originator.
In the indirect origination model, the dealers originate
chattel paper in exchange for the sale of a specic good, such
as an automobile. Such dealers typically acquire the goods
that they sell—the inventory—with nancing provided by
inventory nancers that take a security interest in the inventory perfected by the ling of a nancing statement.73 The
chattel paper is therefore proceeds of the inventory,74 and
the inventory nancer will have a perfected security interest
in the chattel paper whose priority will date from the date of
the ling of the nancing statement.75 Without a superpriority rule, a subsequent purchaser of chattel paper would
typically be subordinate to the inventory nancer. Accordingly, without a super-priority rule, dealers would be limited
to one of two more expensive choices. Either the dealers
would have to obtain nancing of their chattel paper from
their inventory nancers, or the dealers and other nancing
companies would need to negotiate amendments to the
inventory security agreements to subordinate or release the
inventory security interest in the chattel paper sold or
pledged to other nance companies.76
Once a purchaser obtains super-priority by taking posses73

See Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Security Interests
in Personal Property: Cases, Problems and Materials 97-127 (5th ed.
2011) (presenting a prototype of inventory and consumer automobile
secured nancing).
74

See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(64) (2010) (dening “proceeds” to include
“whatever is acquired upon the sale . . . or other disposition of collateral”).
75

See U.C.C. § 9-315(a)(2) (providing that a security interest attaches
to identiable proceeds); § 9-315(c), (d)(1) (providing that perfection of a
security interest in proceeds continues if the security interest in the original collateral was perfected by the ling of a nancing statement and a
security interest in the proceeds may be perfected by a ling); U.C.C. § 9322(a)(1), (2) (priority for the rst to le or perfect or for perfected over
unperfected), quoted supra note 51.
76

See U.C.C. § 9-315(a)(1), which provides that a security interest
continues in collateral notwithstanding sale or other disposition unless
the disposition was authorized free of such security interest. Release provisions for chattel paper could be comparable to the provisions in some
inventory security agreements that permit the sale of inventory to buyers
in ordinary course. Such buyers already take free of the inventory lender's
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sion, the super-priority rule loses a great deal of its economic
signicance. Subsequent transfers of the chattel paper can
be eected by an authenticated security agreement and
perfected by the ling of a nancing statement, and they are
typically done this way. The market practice for selling chattel paper diers from that for mortgage loans. Mortgage
loans are evidenced by promissory notes, and, unlike most
chattel paper (which typically have a three-ve year maturity), are long term assets (typically 15 or 30 years).
Mortgage loans are often traded more than once in the market place, and the transfer of such mortgage loans is
frequently accompanied by a transfer of possession of the
mortgage note. In the case of chattel paper, however, nance
companies that are indirect originators of chattel paper that
acquire possession of tangible chattel paper from the initial
originators often do not transfer possession. The costs are
too great and the risk of a fraudulent or inadvertent
subsequent transfer of possession to a dierent purchaser,
though real, is considered small.
In sum, the quasi-negotiability of tangible chattel paper,
the type of possession necessary to achieve this quasinegotiability, and the necessity for super-priority based on
possession are dierent from and more limited than the negotiability of negotiable promissory notes, the type of possession necessary for negotiability, and the necessity in the
market place for super-priority. The negotiability of negotiable instruments depends upon the existence of a single,
unique writing containing an original signature of the
obligor. On the other hand, the quasi-negotiability of tangible
chattel paper does not depend upon the existence of a single,
unique writing containing an original signature of the
obligor. Tangible chattel paper may consist of multiple copies of a writing each containing an original signature of the
obligor. The quasi-negotiability of tangible chattel paper
therefore depends upon two alternatives. Either one person
has possession of all copies containing the original signature
of the obligor or, as suggested by comment 4 to Section 9-330,
if all of the copies with original signatures designate one of
the originals as the “original” for purposes of possession, one
security interest, see U.C.C. § 9-320(a), but it is common for the security
agreement also to release the security interest in favor of such buyers.
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person has possession of that designated original.77 The interpretation of the denition of “control” for electronic chattel paper should take into account this dierent meaning of
quasi-negotiability and the type of possession necessary to
achieve quasi-negotiability and also the more limited necessity of super-priority of chattel paper.
III. The Quasi Negotiable Status of Chattel Paper
Based on Control
A. The Purpose of Control
Historically, negotiability and quasi-negotiability of negotiable instruments, chattel paper and securities depended
upon possession of the writing evidencing the negotiable
instruments, chattel paper and securities. In response to the
demands of the market, however, the law began in the last
half of the 20th century to recognize non-possessory methods
of maintaining the negotiability of investment property
consisting of uncerticated securities and security
entitlements. These methods rely on a system of registration
of the owners of the uncerticated securities on the books of
the issuer78 and the book entry system recognized by the
1994 revision of Article 8 in which securities intermediaries
77

See U.C.C. § 9-330 cmt. 4, second para.:

Two common practices have raised particular concerns with respect to the
possession requirement [underlined words added in 2010]. First, in some cases
the parties create more than one copy or counterpart of chattel paper evidencing a single secured obligation or lease. This practice raises questions as to
which counterpart is the “original” and whether it is necessary for a purchaser
to take possession of all counterparts in order to “take possession” of the chattel paper . . .. The problem raised by the rst practice is easily solved. The
parties may in the terms of their agreement and by designation on the chattel
paper identify only one counterpart as the original chattel paper for purposes
of taking possession of the chattel paper.
78

See generally U.C.C. Art. 8, prefatory note, pt. I (1994), Unif. Commercial Code, 2C U.L.A. 431-38 (2005) (describing the evolution of the securities holding systems); see also U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(18) (1994) (dening an
“uncerticated security” to mean “a security that is not represented by a
certicate”); U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(15) (part of the denition of a “security” is
that it be an obligation or interest “the transfer of which may be registered
upon books maintained for that purpose by or on behalf of the issuer”);
U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(12) (dening “instruction” to mean “a notication communicated to the issuer of an uncerticated security which directs that
the transfer of the security be registered or that the security be
redeemed”); U.C.C. § 8-207(a) (providing that before presentment of an
instruction requesting registration of transfer of an uncerticated security, the issuer “may treat the registered owner as the person exclusively
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register the holders of security entitlements in securities or
other nancial assets held by the securities intermediaries.79
Unlike the system used for intangible investment property, the denition of “control” in the rst iteration of Section 9-10580 in the 2000 revision of Article 9 and its continuation as a safe harbor in current Section 9-105(b)81 attempts
to maintain the quasi-negotiability of electronic chattel paper
by constructing a denition of “control” as an analogue to
possession. Therefore, the initial denition rationally
included a requirement for a single and unique authoritative
copy of the electronic chattel paper as an analogue of the
single and unique nature of every tangible item of property.82
The goal was to provide a purchaser of electronic chattel
paper the same benets that a purchaser of tangible chattel
paper could obtain by taking possession.
When the initial originator of electronic chattel paper assigns the chattel paper, whether by sale or a grant of a secuentitled to vote, receive notications, and otherwise exercise all the rights
and powers of an owner”); U.C.C. § 8-301(b) (providing that “delivery” of
an uncerticated security requires registration of the purchaser or its
agent as the registered owner).
79

See U.C.C. Art. 8, prefatory note, pt. I, supra note 78; U.C.C. § 8102(a)(7) (1994) (dening an “entitlement holder” as the “person identied
in the records of a securities intermediary as the person having a security
entitlement against the securities intermediary”); U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(14)
(dening a “securities intermediary” as a “(i) a clearing corporation; or (ii)
a person, including a bank or broker, that in the ordinary course of its
business maintains securities accounts for others and is acting in that
capacity”); U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(17) (dening “security entitlement” to mean
“the rights and property interest of an entitlement holder with respect to
a nancial asset specied in Part 5 [of Article 8]”); U.C.C. § 8-501(b)
(providing that a person acquires a security entitlement when a securities
intermediary credits a nancial asset to a securities account maintained
by the securities intermediary); see also Schroeder, Is Article 8 Finally
Ready This Time? The Radical Reform of Secured Lending on Wall Street,
1994 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 291, 298-99 (1994) (expressing concerns about
what she calls the “supernegotiability” of securities and security entitlements under the 1994 revision of Article 8).
80

See U.C.C. § 9-105(1) (2000), quoted supra note 9.

81

See U.C.C. § 9-105(b)(1) (2010), quoted supra note 21.

82

For a discussion of the history of the drafting of the initial Section
9-105 and the diculties that the drafters faced in developing standards
that were neither too restrictive nor too lax, see Winn, Electronic Chattel
Paper: Invitation Accepted, 46 Gonz. L. Rev. 407, 415-20 (2010) [hereinafter, Winn, Electronic Chattel Paper 2010].
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rity interest to secure a debt, to a nance company, the
nance company seeks to obtain “control” to perfect the assignment without the ling of a nancing statement.83 More
importantly, as described above, the nance company seeks
to obtain super-priority over any other secured party that
has a security interest in the chattel paper perfected by a
previously led nancing statement.84
A failure by nance companies to obtain control is not a
signicant problem for perfecting their interest. Finance
companies can perfect their interest by ling a nancing
statement. To be sure, to le nancing statements against
hundreds or thousands of initial originators will increase
costs, but the costs are small relative to the dollar volume of
chattel paper that nance companies acquire from the initial
originators. On the other hand, obtaining super-priority in
electronic chattel paper by control against inventory secured
parties is very important for the same reasons why nance
companies obtain super-priority in tangible chattel paper by
possession.85
As in the case of nance companies that obtain possession
of tangible chattel paper from the initial originators to
achieve super-priority over inventory nancers, however,
once a nance company acquires control of the electronic
chattel paper, there is no great need for that nance
company to transfer control. For example, when rating securities backed by receivables evidenced by chattel paper, such
as automobile loans, Standard and Poor's Rating Services
requires that the nance companies that sell more than a
certain percentage of electronic chattel paper into the
securitization demonstrate that they have obtained control
of the chattel paper. Standard and Poor's will perform due
diligence on the control procedures and will require a legal
opinion on “control” from a law rm.86 Standard and Poor's
does not, however, require the subsequent transfer of control
83

See U.C.C § 9-314(a) (2010) (providing that a “security interest in
investment property, deposit accounts, letter-of-credit rights, or electronic
chattel paper may be perfected by control of the collateral under Section
9-104, 9-105, 9-106, or 9-107”).
84

See U.C.C. § 9-330(a), (b), quoted supra note 40.

85

See supra note 76 and accompanying text.

86

See Standard & Poor's Rating Services, Legal Criteria for U.S.
Structured Finance Transactions 66-67 (2006).
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to the issuers of the rated securities, and instead relies on
perfection of such transfer by ling. 87 Also, for nance
companies that originate automobile loans directly to the
purchaser of the automobile loan, super-priority based on
possession or control is not necessary.88
Further, a person with possession of tangible chattel paper
does have the capacity to transfer such possession to
subsequent purchasers. Because of the dierences between
the essential characteristics of tangible and electronic chattel paper as property items, however, control is more
ephemeral. As discussed below, a person that has dominion
over an electronic record evidencing electronic chattel paper
may have no capacity or only a diminished capacity to
transfer “control” to a subsequent purchaser. The limited necessity for control and the limited ability to transfer control
may permit the development of a system of control for
nance companies purchasing electronic chattel paper from
initial originators that eschews the current possessory
analogue of “control.”
An originator and its customer may create electronic chattel paper initially in electronic form. In the indirect origination industry, the nance company that acquires the chattel
paper from the dealer will need control. Alternatively, the
originator and its customer may create chattel paper in
tangible form and then at some point the chattel paper is
converted to electronic chattel paper. For converted chattel
paper, then, a nance company that acquires the chattel
may need to ensure both possession and control. Satisfying
the more general “reliably establishes” standard of revised
Section 9-105(a) for control, however, may be easier for
converted electronic chattel paper.
B. Initially Created Electronic Chattel Paper
For chattel paper initially created in the form of an
87

See Standard & Poor's Rating Services, Legal Criteria for U.S.
Structured Finance Transactions 66-67 (2006).
88

See Standard & Poor's Rating Services, Legal Criteria for U.S.
Structured Finance Transactions 66–67 (2006):
For direct originations of electronic chattel paper, Standard & Poor's does
not look for perfection by control for transfers by the originator to subsequent
transferees. As with tangible chattel paper, Standard & Poor's relies on covenants by the originator not to transfer control to a third party (other than an
SPE or securitization trustee), which would enable the third party to have
priority over the rated noteholders.
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electronic record or records, current industry methods that
have satised this strict denition are essentially book entry
systems comparable to that for securities and security
entitlements with one important distinction. Under a common and developing current industry method,89 the initial
originator of the electronic chattel paper and the potential
assignee-secured party contract with a third party custodian
that actually creates and holds the electronic record as the
authoritative copy in an electronic vault subject to a control
system that regulates access to the authoritative copy. This
third party custodian establishes procedures to ensure
compliance with all of the requirements of the original Section 9-105 and the current safe harbor of Section 9-105(b) for
any interactions with the authoritative copy in the electronic
vault.90 The custodian then maintains the electronic chattel
paper on behalf of the initial secured party or the assignee of
the secured party.
There is no requirement for a third party custodian. As an
alternative, the nance company that will acquire the
electronic chattel paper could establish and operate the
electronic contracting and vaulting system. This procedure
would establish control in the nance company as against
the dealer-originator. This procedure, however, may present
challenges for the subsequent assignment of control to future
purchasers. The use of a custodian would more easily permit
the subsequent assignment of the electronic chattel paper
and the transfer of control to future purchasers. On the other
hand, as discussed above, there is less need to provide for
the subsequent transfer of control. Instead, nance companies will use third party custodians when reliance on such
89

See Working Group on Transferability of Electronic Financial Assets, supra note 18 (providing a detailed discussion of a control system
and control environment that would satisfy the requirements of the denition of the original denition and the current safe harbor denition of
“control”); ABA Cyberspace Committee Working Group on Transferable
Records, supra note 19, at 385–86 (containing a brief description of the
electronic vaulting method “that takes advantage of a self-contained,
secured environment and leverages the fact that with an electronic record
it is control over access, and not physical location, that is of chief
importance to the owner of the record”).
90

See U.C.C. § 9-330(a), (b) (2010), quoted supra note 40.
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specialists is more ecient than developing in-house control
systems.91
1. Safe Harbor: Single and Unique Authoritative
Copy.
As noted above,92 the characteristics of an electronic record
present challenges to satisfying the requirement in original
Section 9-105 and in current Section 9-105(b) that a “single
authoritative copy of the record or records exists which is
unique.”93 Each electronic record can be perfectly replicated.
Further, an electronic record may exist in the form of
multiple bits of data that are stored in dierent parts of a
hard drive or other equipment, in dierent hard drives, or
even in dierent systems but that, by virtue of the computer
system processes, are retrievable in perceivable form as one
record or one set of records. In any one computer system
there may be more than one copy of the record or set of records, including temporary or permanent back-up copies.
Comment 2 to original and revised Section 9-105 states
that control of electronic chattel paper is the “functional
equivalent” of possession of tangible chattel paper.94 The key
word in this comment is “functional.” A requirement for a
physically “unique” electronic record comparable to the physical uniqueness of tangible chattel paper would render
“control” of electronic chattel paper unworkable if not
impossible. Nevertheless, the requirement for a single and
unique authoritative copy is satised by a computer system
91

For example, RouteOne LLC is one company that provides vaulting
services for nance companies and dealers. According to its website, it
was formed more than 10 years ago by Ally Financial, Ford Motor Credit,
TD Auto Finance, and Toyota Financial Services. RouteOne, About Us,
http://www.routeone.com/about-us (last visited July 29, 2014).
92

See notes 18 & 19 supra and accompanying text. See also Winn,
Electronic Chattel Paper Under Revised Article 9: Updating the Concept
of Embodied Rights for Electronic Commerce, 74 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1055,
1061 (1999) [hereinafter, Winn, Electronic Chattel Paper 1999] (nothing
that an electronic record cannot be unique in the same sense that a signed
original chattel paper is unique); ABA Cyberspace Committee Working
Group on Transferable Records, supra note 19, at 381 (noting that
electronic records are often held in dynamic les or on a networked array
of storage devices).
93

See U.C.C. § 9-105(1) (2000), quoted supra note 9, and U.C.C. § 9105(b)(1) (2010), quoted supra note 21.
94

See U.C.C. § 9-105 cmt. 2 (2000), and U.C.C. § 9-105 cmt. 2 (2010),
quoted supra note 10.
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and procedures that identify one record or set of records that
is retrievable as the “authoritative” copy and that identify
any other otherwise identical records, including back-up records, that are retrievable in perceivable form as a nonauthoritative copy.95 Similarly, the computer procedures and
protocols should require that any printed copies be labelled
as non-authoritative copies. These procedures also satisfy
the requirements of clause (5) that each copy of the authoritative copy and any copy of a copy is readily identiable as a
copy that is not the authoritative copy.96
The use of computer systems and procedures that identify
one record or set of records that is retrievable as the “authoritative” is supported by several commentators who have
addressed the requirement for a single and unique authoritative copy. For example, Professor Jane Winn has succinctly
described the issue of “uniqueness”:
The issue is, therefore, not whether the electronic chattel
paper record is absolutely unique in the sense that chattel
paper represented by a piece of paper is a unique collection of
atoms in the material world, because no electronic record used
in an electronic business information system can be unique in
that sense. Rather, the electronic chattel paper record must
95

See Working Group on Transferability of Electronic Financial Assets, supra note 18, § 3.1.2, ques. 4 at 731 (noting that the actions that
may be taken by an authorized participant include identifying the authoritative copy but also noting that armative action may not be needed and
that the “identication of the single authoritative copy as such follows
from its attributes and existence with a Control System”); Working Group
on Transferability of Electronic Financial Assets, supra note 18, § 3.1.2,
ques. 6 at 731–32 (describing how non-authoritative copies are readily
identiable); Working Group on Transferability of Electronic Financial Assets, supra note 18, § 3.1.4, ques. 8 at 732 (describing the monitoring of
authoritative and non-authoritative copies); Working Group on Transferability of Electronic Financial Assets, supra note 18, § 3.2.1, ques. 1 at 734
(describing identication of the authoritative copy); Working Group on
Transferability of Electronic Financial Assets, supra note 18, § 3.3, ques. 1
at 736 (describing identication of non-authoritative copies); Working
Group on Transferability of Electronic Financial Assets, supra note 18,
§ 3.4.1, at 737–38 (discussing uniqueness of authoritative copy); ABA
Cyberspace Committee Working Group on Transferable Records, supra
note 19, at 386 (discussing uniqueness and distinguishing nonauthoritative copies).
96

See U.C.C. § 9-105(5) (2000), quoted supra note 9, and U.C.C. § 9105(b)(5) (2010), quoted supra note 21.
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exist within a computer system which is designed to distinguish one special copy of the record as uniquely signicant.97

The ABA Cyberspace Committee Working Group on
Transferable Records also addressed the issue of uniqueness
as follows:
The rst requirement of the [original Section 9-105], for an
“authoritative copy,” reects a reality of the electronic environment noted earlier-there is no such thing as an “original” document that can be transferred from person to person. The
transmittal of an electronic document results in the creation of
a new copy, not the physical transposition of the existing copy.
A copy, to qualify as the authoritative copy, must meet three
criteria-it must be unique, identiable, and (except as
otherwise provided) unalterable.
“Unique” is not otherwise dened, and it therefore should be
understood in its simple dictionary sense; that is, the authoritative copy must have a characteristic that distinguishes it
from other copies. That characteristic may be provided by
technology, or by process or agreement. For example, an authoritative copy stored within a controlled-access system may
be provided with a unique control number, or be held in a
specied server or other location that makes it distinguishable
from other copies . . ..
The authoritative copy does not have to be static over time.
The copy that qualies as the “authoritative copy” at one time,
during or after the transaction, need not be the same copy
that qualies as the authoritative copy at another time. All
that is required is that, at any given moment, there be a single
authoritative copy.98

Companies that oer custodian services for initially created
electronic chattel paper have developed the detailed and
complicated computer systems and procedures that are necessary to satisfy the requirement of a single and unique authoritative copy. With the new “reliably establishes” standard for control, however, some of these procedures may no
longer be strictly necessary.
2. Safe Harbor: Other requirements
Aside from the requirement for a single and unique authoritative copy discussed below, the requirements for
control under the original Section 9-105 and the current safe
harbor of Section 9-105(b) are not dicult to satisfy. The
97

Winn, Electronic Chattel Paper (1999), supra note 92, at 1061.

98

See The ABA Cyberspace Committee Working Group on Transferable Records, supra note 19, at 384–85.
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control system provisions of the custodian can establish
compliance99 with the following clauses of the denition of
control in original Section 9-105100 and in current Section
9-105(b):101
(1) “a single authoritative copy of the record or records
exists which is . . . identiable, and, except as otherwise
provided in paragraphs (4), (5), and (6), unalterable”: To exist, any receivable must be identiable. Establishing
procedures for the identication of the authoritative copy are
not dicult. The computer systems and procedures for
establishing control can ensure such identication and
ensure that there are no improper alterations.102
(2) “the authoritative copy identies the secured party as
the assignee of the record or records”: Again, any system for
the assignment of receivables must be able to identify the
assignee, and the control system can ensure such
identication. There is no need that the actual electronic
contract originally created by the obligor and the initial
originator be revised to show such assignee. Because an authoritative copy can be a “record or records,” the authoritative copy can consist of both the record that contains the
original electronic contract and a separate record that serves
as an ownership log, as in a book entry system, that is logically tied by the computer system processes to the contract
99

See Working Group on Transferability of Electronic Financial Assets, supra note 18, § 3.4.2 at 738–39 (discussing the “identiable” requirement); Working Group on Transferability of Electronic Financial Assets,
supra note 18, § 3.4.3 at 739–42 (discussing the “unalterable” requirement
and the permissible amendments and revisions); Working Group on
Transferability of Electronic Financial Assets, supra note 18, § 3.5 at
742–44 (discussing assignment and transfer); ABA Cyberspace Committee
Working Group on Transferable Records, supra note 19, at 385–86 (a
more summary description of the requirements of the denition).
100

See U.C.C. § 9-105 (2000), quoted supra note 9.

101

See U.C.C. § 9-105(b) (2010), quoted supra note 21.

102

See The ABA Cyberspace Committee Working Group on Transferable Records, supra note 19, at 384:
As a practical matter, if a record is unique, then almost by denition it is
identiable, so that the second criteria for an authoritative copy appears
redundant. The most sensible interpretation of the “identiability” rule is that
the document management system being used, or the agreement of the parties,
must explicitly dene the authoritative copy in terms of its unique
characteristic. In other words, an agreement or system rule presumably must
specify or describe the unique feature that identies the authoritative copy,
and how that unique feature can be accessed or conrmed.
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through a unique identication number for each electronic
contract.103
(3) “the authoritative copy is communicated to and
maintained by the secured party or its designated custodian”:
Maintenance of the authoritative copy by the secured party
or its custodian is a feature of the control system. The only
quibble could be the statutory requirement that the authoritative copy be “communicated” to the secured party or the
custodian. The custodian (or the intended assignee secured
party) of the electronic chattel paper maintains the electronic
record in its electronic vault. For this reason, the authoritative copy is never “communicated”104 in one sense to the
custodian (or intended assignee secured party).
Nevertheless, the creation of the contract does require
that the obligor and the initial originator communicate information to the custodian (or the intended assignee secured
party) to create the electronic chattel paper. If a custodian
maintains the chattel paper, the initial originator and the
intended assignee also communicate information between
themselves and through the custodian to eect the assignment of the electronic chattel paper from the initial originator to the assignee secured party through the custodian's
system. This communication of the information by the initial
originator to the custodian (or the intended assignee secured
party) that provides for the creation and assignment of the
authoritative copy should satisfy the requirements for such
“communication” of the authoritative copy to the secured
party or its custodian.
A contrary interpretation would require the transmission
of electronic chattel paper from one entity—the initial
originator or a custodian for the originator—to a separate
entity—the assignee secured party or the custodian for the
assignee secured party. As noted above,105 such transmission
actually creates a new electronic record for the recipient and
by itself could leave the transmitter in possession of an
103

See The ABA Cyberspace Committee Working Group on Transferable Records, supra note 19, at 386.
104

See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(18)(B) (2010) (providing that the word “communicate” includes “to transmit a record by any means agreed upon by
the persons sending and receiving the record”) [emphasis added]. The use
of the word “includes” permits a broader denition of “communicate” that
serves the purpose of maintain control of electronic chattel paper.
105

See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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identical electronic record. Such a transmission requirement
would needlessly increase costs, would present the risk of
diminished security for the “control” of a single authoritative
copy of the electronic record under the safe harbor requirements,106 and would serve no useful purpose.
(4) “copies or amendments [revisions] that add or change
an identied assignee of the authoritative copy can be made
only with the consent [participation] of the secured party”:
Again, a control system will contain the necessary procedures
and protocols to ensure that the secured party must approve
changes in the identied assignee.
(5) “each copy of the authoritative copy and any copy of a
copy is readily identiable as a copy that is not the authoritative copy”: This requirement is part of the requirement for
a single and unique authoritative copy discussed in detail
above.
(6) “any amendment [revision] of the authoritative copy is
readily identiable as authorized or unauthorized”: Again, a
control system will contain the necessary procedures and
protocols to ensure authorized revisions or amendments.
C. The “Reliably Establishes” Standard: No Single
or Unique Requirement
The requirements for a single and unique authoritative
copy and the dierentiation between authoritative and nonauthoritative copies in the safe harbor are more appropriate
for a robust level of negotiability, like that for a negotiable
instrument.107 The requirement for a single and unique authoritative copy of an electronic promissory note would be
useful to protect the maker of the note. If a person could be
deemed to have control over two identical authoritative copies of a negotiable promissory note and qualied as a holder
in due course, theoretically, the maker of the note could be
required to pay two notes.108
Interestingly, the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act
(“UETA”), promulgated in 1999 after the drafters of revised
Article 9 had added the denition of “control” to the then
106

For a discussion about how under the “reliably establishes” standard, transmission of and retention by the initial originator of the
electronic chattel paper may not destroy the ability to transfer control, see
infra notes 115–116 and accompanying text.
107

See supra notes 41–45 and accompanying text.

108

See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text.
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current draft of Article 9 in 1998, 109 included the more
stringent denition of “control” of “transferrable records,”
with the requirement for a single and unique authoritative
copy, as a safe harbor to the “reliably establishes” standard
that now appears in the 2010 revision of Section 9-105(a).110
A transferrable record under UETA is a record that, but for
a writing, would qualify as a negotiable instrument under
UCC Article 3 or a negotiable document of title under UCC
Article 7. 111 Similarly, in 2000, the federal Electronic
Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (“eSign”),
enacted a similar control provision containing the general
standard and the restrictive safe harbor for a “transferrable
record” under eSign, which is dened as an electronic record
that would be a negotiable note under Article 3 and that relates to a loan secured by a mortgage.112
For the purposes of the quasi-negotiability of chattel paper,
however, the existence of a single and unique authoritative
copy is not critical to establish control. To establish perfection and super-priority against the initial originator, it would
be sucient if the assignee secured party or a custodian
have the only authoritative electronic copy or copies of the
electronic chattel paper. For example, a custodian could
maintain the electronic chattel paper in its vault on behalf
of an originating automobile dealer until the dealer assigns
the chattel paper to a nance company through the custodian's system. In either case, it makes no dierence if the assignee secured party or custodian has one copy or 100 copies
of the electronic record so long as (a) all copies are “authoritative,” that is, there are no variations among the copies,
and (b) in the case of the custodian, the custodian identies
only one person for which it is maintaining control.
109

See Winn, Electronic Chattel Paper 2010, supra note 82, at 416,
418, 421–22.
110

See U.E.T.A § 16(b) (1999) (general “reliably establishes” standard),
§ 16(c) (safe harbor requiring, among other items, a single and unique authoritative copy). UETA has been adopted by 47 states and the District of
Columbia with numerous non-uniform amendments. See Uniform Law
Commission, Electronic Transaction Act), available at http://www.uniform
laws.org/Act.aspx?title=Electronic Transactions Act (last visited July 29,
2014).
111

See U.E.T.A § 16(a)(1) (1999).

112

15 U.S.C.A. § 7021(a)(1) (denition of transferrable record),
§ 7021(b) (general denition of control), § 7021(c) (safe harbor denition of
control).
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The rst paragraph of Comment 4 to current Section 9-330
seems to conrm this interpretation of control of electronic
chattel paper in light of its purpose of solving for ostensible
ownership and the possibility of debtor-secured party fraud.
In addressing chattel paper that comprises one or more
tangible records and one or more electronic records, the comment states:
[A] purchaser may satisfy the possession-or-control requirement by taking possession of the tangible records under Section 9-313 and having control of the electronic records under
Section 9-105. In determining which of several related records
constitutes chattel paper and thus is relevant to possession or
control, the form of the records is irrelevant. Rather, the
touchstone is whether possession or control of the record would
aord the public notice contemplated by the possession and
control requirements.113

For these reasons, a standard of control under Section
9-105(a) that a system “reliably establish” the secured party
as the person to which the chattel paper was assigned should
not require the maintenance of a single authoritative copy
that is unique and distinguishable from other copies held in
the system. Instead, the “singleness” and the “uniqueness” of
the electronic chattel paper should refer to the fact that only
one person has dominion over the electronic chattel paper.
One counter to this suggestion appears in the revised comment 3 to Section 9-105. It states:
As under UETA, a system must be shown to reliably establish
that the secured party is the assignee of the chattel paper.
Reliability is a high standard and encompasses the general
principles of uniqueness, identiability, and unalterability
found in subsection (b) without setting forth specic guidelines
as to how these principles must be achieved.114

This comment, however, refers to uniqueness without reference to a “single authoritative copy” or the necessity that
non-authoritative copies be distinguishable from the authoritative copy. If a custodian holds multiple copies of electronic
chattel paper for the benet of a secured party, but no other
person has any electronic copies or a written copy that
purports to be an original, the chattel paper held by the
custodian represents a single and unique monetary obligation of the obligor, regardless of how many copies exist. So
113

See U.C.C. § 9-330 cmt. 4, rst para. (2010).

114

See U.C.C. § 9-105 cmt. 3.
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long as no other person has a copy of the electronic chattel
paper, dominion by the assignee or its custodian over the
electronic chattel paper regardless of the number of copies
should satisfy the “principles” of uniqueness required by the
safe harbor.
D. The Future: A System of Control Not Based on
the Possession Analogy
Custodians have developed systems that do comply with
the stricter requirements of the safe harbor. Because of the
importance for purchasers of electronic chattel paper of
obtaining super-priority over the secured creditors of dealers, nance companies may insist that these systems
continue to meet the more stringent safe harbor. On the
other hand, the constant pressures on businesses in a competitive market to reduce costs may induce custodians and
assignee secured parties to search for less expensive methods
of establishing control.
For example, if an initial originator, like a dealer, initially
created electronic chattel paper directly and assigned it to a
nance company and retained an electronic copy of the chattel paper, could the automobile nancer nevertheless have
control? Under an analysis that is analogous to that used for
tangible chattel paper, which seems to be embedded in the
comments to Section 9-330 discussed above,115 the argument
would be that the assignee should not have control because
the dealer could market its electronic chattel paper to
subsequent purchasers who do not have notice of the prior
assignment. In this case, however, the analogy with tangible
chattel paper breaks down.
For tangible chattel paper, the existence of the original
wet ink signed tangible chattel paper in the hands of a dealer
may indicate that the dealer owns the tangible chattel paper
and that the dealer can assign it to a subsequent purchaser
for value in ordinary course without notice. But for the possible existence of multiple originals held by dierent persons,
transfer of possession is enough to perfect the transfer. But
electronic chattel paper is dierent. It is not tangible, and it
cannot exist without a separate computer system.
The existence of the electronic record purporting to be
chattel paper in the initial originator's computer system
115

See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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does not by itself establish the existence of the chattel paper
that the initial originator owns or purports to own in the
way that a tangible document does. There is no “ostensible
ownership” of electronic chattel paper. It is essentially
intangible like any account carried on the books of the owner
of the account. Accordingly, any potential purchaser of
electronic chattel paper that was not involved in the creation
of the chattel paper—which involvement is an integral part
of the indirect origination model—would need to do more
due diligence to establish the existence of the chattel paper.
The type of due diligence would resemble the type of due diligence that purchasers of accounts undertake to establish
the existence of the account, including the tracking of cash
ows relating to the receivables such as payments by the
obligor.116
Moreover, a transfer of possession of tangible chattel paper
actually transfers a physical thing. A transmission of the
electronic chattel paper does not. Such a transmission creates a new electronic record, and depending on the manner
of transmission the sender may retain an identical copy.
Hence, by itself a transmission of the electronic chattel paper
is not enough to transfer control, especially under the safe
harbor requirement of a single and unique authoritative
copy. Potential purchasers should know the limitations of an
electronic record. Except in the case of an assignment immediately upon creation, the existence of the electronic record does provide notice of the diculty of obtaining control.
These limitations may permit the use of a more exible
system for the transfer of control, especially to an assignee
that participates in the initial creation of the electronic chattel paper in the indirect origination model.
Accordingly, it may be possible for an initial originator of
electronic chattel paper to establish a system by which it
reliably establishes an assignee as the person to which the
chattel paper has been assigned even though the originator
retains an electronic copy. Further, such a system may
resemble a system of assignment of other intangible receivables, perhaps enhanced in some way, more than a system
that resembles the assignment of tangible chattel paper and
written promissory notes. Such a system is at this point
116

See Plank, Assignment of Receivables: Structural Incoherence,
supra note 15, at 267.
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merely a possibility. Needless to say, developing such a
system would require a great deal more thought.
E. Converted Electronic Chattel Paper
If a person in possession of tangible chattel paper converts
it into an electronic record, the electronic record becomes
electronic chattel paper.117 The drafters of Article 9 contemplated the use of electronic chattel paper that had been
converted from tangible chattel paper.118 The provisions for
control for purposes of attachment under Section
9-203(b)(3)(D), perfection under Section 9-314(a) and most
importantly super-priority under Section 9-330(a) and (b)
would apply. Typically the conversion from tangible to
electronic chattel paper is accomplished through a scanning
and imaging process that produces an image of the tangible
chattel paper.
1. Safe Harbor
Compliance with the denition of control under the original Section 9-105 and the safe harbor of current Section
9-105(b) would still depend on the existences of a single and
unique authoritative copy. Again, because the electronic record may be replicated perfectly, satisfying this requirement
requires a system that eectively designates one record or
set of records as the authoritative copy and that eectively
designates all other copies, including back-up copies, as nonauthoritative copies. Financers and their custodians have
developed systems that meet these requirements comparable
to the systems developed for originally created electronic
chattel paper discussed above. These systems can ensure
that only the assignee secured party or its custodian has one
copy of the electronic chattel paper designated as the authoritative copy and that all other copies are designated or
marked as non-authoritative copies.119 These systems can
117

See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(70) (2010) (dening “record”), quoted supra
note 4; U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(31) (dening “electronic chattel paper”), quoted
supra note 8.
118

See U.C.C. § 9-105 cmt. 3 (2000) and U.C.C. § 9-105 cmt. 4 (2010),
quoted infra text accompanying note 123.
119

See supra notes 92–98 and accompanying text.
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also satisfy the other requirements of the safe harbor
discussed above.120
Converted chattel paper, however, does present an additional issue. To what extent does the existence of the
tangible chattel paper aect the control of the electronic
chattel paper? The purpose of converting from tangible to
electronic chattel paper is to reduce the cost of storage and
retrieval of the chattel paper. Hence, the tangible chattel
paper that has been converted to electronic form—really,
copied to electronic form—is typically destroyed after some
period of time. Nevertheless, because of the desirability of
ensuring that the imaging process has accurately and successfully replicated the tangible chattel paper, the system
should allow for some delay in the destruction so that any
errors in the conversion process may be detected and
corrected.
One could interpret the language of clause (1) of original
Section 9-501 and revised Section 9-105(b) that a secured
party has “control” of electronic chattel paper if, inter alia,
“the record or records comprising the chattel paper are
created, stored, and assigned in such a manner that (1) a
single authoritative copy of the record or records exists
[emphasis added].”121 If the reference to “record or records”
encompasses only the electronic records, the existence of a
single and unique authoritative copy of the electronic chattel
paper is sucient to create control, regardless of the
continued existence of the original tangible chattel paper. Of
course, to fulll the purpose of providing for possession or
control of chattel paper, the secured party (directly or
through one or more custodians) must have both possession
of the tangible chattel paper and control of the electronic
chattel paper.122
Notwithstanding this interpretation, it would be prudent
simply to designate the tangible chattel paper as a nonauthoritative copy. The term “chattel paper” in the phrase
120

See supra note 99–107 and accompanying text
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See U.C.C. § 9-105(1) (2000), quoted supra note 9; U.C.C. § 9105(b)(1) (2010), quoted supra note 21. Similarly, the reference in original
Section 9-105(5) and revised Section 9-105(b)(5) to distinguishing authoritative and non-authoritative copies can reasonably be interpreted in each
case to refer only to copies that consist of electronic records.
122

See U.C.C. § 9-330 cmt. 4, rst para. (2010), quoted supra in text accompanying note 113 (added in 2010 revision).
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“the record or records comprising the chattel paper” could be
read to refer not only to the electronic record or records
comprising electronic chattel paper but also to any existing
tangible records comprising the tangible chattel paper from
which the electronic chattel paper was created. If so, control
of the electronic chattel paper would require the existence of
a single authoritative copy of all the records, both electronic
and tangible.
Comment 3 to original and comment 4 current Section
9-105 supports this interpretation:
One requirement for establishing control under paragraph (b)
is that a particular copy be an “authoritative copy.” Although
other copies may exist, they must be distinguished from the
authoritative copy. This may be achieved, for example, through
the methods of authentication that are used or by business
practices involving the marking of any additional copies. When
tangible chattel paper is converted to electronic chattel paper,
in order to establish that a copy of the electronic chattel paper
is the authoritative copy it may be necessary to show that the
tangible chattel paper no longer exists or has been permanently marked to indicate that it is not the authoritative
copy.123

A system that suciently designates the tangible chattel
paper as the non-authoritative should satisfy this interpretation of this control provision. The comment does refer to
the alternative of permanently marking the tangible chattel
paper, but such marking is likely not cost eective. Nor
should the method of identifying such tangible records as
the non-authoritative copy be so limited. So long as the
tangible contracts are held by the assignee secured party
(directly or through one or more of its custodians),124 business procedures adopted by the assignee secured party or
custodian designating such tangible contracts as nonauthoritative copies and preventing the removal of such
tangible records (unless appropriately marked) pending destruction should be sucient.
2. The “Reliably Establishes” Standard
The analysis that under the “reliably establishes” standard the “single and unique” requirement no longer applies
for electronic chattel paper applies equally to converted
123

See U.C.C. § 9-105 cmt. 3 (2000); U.C.C. § 9-105 cmt. 4 (2010).
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See U.C.C. § 9-330 cmt. 4, rst para. (2010), quoted supra in text accompanying note 113 (added in 2010 revision).
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electronic chattel paper produced by a scanning and imaging
process. A person can have control of the converted electronic
chattel paper if it has all of the authoritative copies, regardless of number.
Further, to the extent that the image is unalterable
without detection to the same extent that a writing is
unalterable, compliance with the requirements of the general “reliably establishes” standard of current 9-105(a) may
be easier. If the electronic image of the tangible chattel paper
shows an assignment from the initial originator to the
nance company as assignee secured party, the conversion
process would constitute a system employed for evidencing
the transfer of interests in the chattel paper that “reliably
establishes the secured party as the person to which the
chattel paper was assigned.”125
Such an electronic record would satisfy the basic requirement for establishing the quasi-negotiability of chattel paper.
Regardless of who has a copy of the electronic record—
including the original assignor—no subsequent purchaser
can be without notice of the assignment to the assignee
claiming control.126 The existence of multiple copies of this
type of electronic record would not multiply the obligation of
the obligor on the chattel paper, and the obligor would be obligated to pay only the original secured party on the chattel
paper or, after receiving notice of assignment to an assignee,
to pay the assignee.
If the initial originator retained a copy of the electronic
record, the originator may have the ability to alter the image
in the record to delete the assignment to the assignee
secured party and then attempt to resell the chattel paper to
another purchaser. Such alteration would be the result of an
intentionally fraudulent action by the initial originator. It
125

See U.C.C. § 9-105(a) (dening “control”).

126

For a purchaser to have super-priority in chattel paper claimed
merely as proceeds, the chattel paper must not indicate that is has been
assigned. For a purchaser to have super-priority in chattel paper claimed
other than merely as proceeds, the purchaser must be without knowledge
that the purchase violates the rights of another person. See U.C.C. § 9330(a), quoted supra note 40. The assignment language in the electronic
chattel paper would provide such knowledge. See U.C.C. § 9-330(f) (providing that “if chattel paper or an instrument indicates that it has been assigned to an identied secured party other than the purchaser, a purchaser
of the chattel paper or instrument has knowledge that the purchase
violates the rights of the secured party”).
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would not occur by accident or inadvertence. The ease with
which such alteration could be done without detection by a
subsequent purchaser may aect the determination that the
conversion process reliably establishes the assignment to the
secured party. On the other hand, after delivering possession of an originally signed tangible chattel paper to a
purchaser, the initial originator could easily produce a fraudulent duplicate copy bearing what appears to be an original
signature of the obligor of tangible chattel paper and sell
that to a dierent purchaser. That possibility would not destroy the rst purchaser's possession of the tangible chattel
paper.
Also, regardless of how many copies of the chattel paper
exist, the obligor has only one payment obligation. The
obligor will only pay the original assignor until the obligor
receives notication of an assignment. Whether fraudulent
or inadvertent, a double assignment of chattel paper, which
normally requires monthly payments, soon becomes
apparent. This fact acts as a practical constraint on double
assignments.
Hence the possibility of fraudulent alteration of the
electronic chattel paper in the form of a scanned image
should not destroy the rst purchaser's control of the
electronic chattel paper. As comment 3 to current Section
9-105 states, “the standards applied to determine whether a
party is in control of electronic chattel paper should not be
more stringent than the standards now applied to determine
whether a party is in possession of tangible chattel paper.”127
Finally, even if the converted electronic chattel paper
consists of a generally unalterable image, it is nevertheless
an intangible item of property. To be sure, a generally
unalterable image may appear to resemble a tangible property item. Nevertheless, any purchaser other than the initial
intended assignee secured party in the indirect origination
model of origination would need to do the necessary due diligence to verify the existence of the obligation represented
by the image. As with initially created electronic chattel
paper and regardless of the extent of the alterability of the
converted electronic chattel paper, it may be possible for an
initial originator of electronic chattel paper to create a
system by which it reliably establishes an assignee as the
127

See U.C.C. § 9-105 cmt. 3 (2000); U.C.C. § 9-105 cmt. 4 (2010).
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person to which the chattel paper has been assigned that
resembles a system of assignment of other intangible
receivables more than a system that relies on a possessory
paradigm.
IV. Conclusion
The tangible nature of the initial form of chattel paper
and the business practices of those involved in the creation
of chattel paper of necessity required the implementation of
a form of quasi-negotiability of chattel paper. The initial
drafters of Article 9 determined that providing super-priority
to a purchaser of chattel paper that is proceeds of inventory
over a secured inventory nancer was the best rule for the
various parties. It was only natural for the initial drafters of
Article 9 to follow the then existing practices to rely on the
transfer of possession of the chattel paper as a means for
achieving this super-priority.
With the evolution from paper to electronic records, it was
reasonable to attempt to adopt a system of control of
electronic chattel paper that followed a possessory paradigm.
On the other hand, it was not the only way to achieve superpriority. Article 9 has long contained a super-priority rule
for purchase money security interests that does not require
any transfer of a tangible item to the secured party with the
super-priority.128
A super-priority rule comparable to the purchaser money
security interest super-priority geared to the indirect origination model for chattel paper may have been sucient. Aside
from the necessity for achieving super-priority over an inventory lender that in many cases will have been the rst to le
a nancing statement, there is in the market place no great
demand for or need for the quasi negotiability of chattel
paper.
The industry has adapted to the rules for control that follow the quasi-possessory paradigm. The question remains
whether the “reliably establishes” standard for control of
electronic chattel paper will permit a system of assignment
128

See U.C.C. § 9-324 (2010) (super-priority of purchase money security interest in goods). Article 9 also contains a super-priority rule for buyers in ordinary course of inventory subject to a security interest, but this
rule does require transfer of possession of the good to the buyer. See
U.C.C. § 9-320(a) (buyer in ordinary course takes free of security interest);
U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(9) (2008) (denition of buyer in ordinary course).
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that eschews reliance on the analogy to possession of a
tangible item of property and looks to other systems that do
reliably establish the assignment of intangible property
items.
In this regard, given the limited reasons for quasinegotiability of chattel paper in contrast to the reasons for
negotiability of negotiable promissory notes and documents
of title, the fact that the language of the dierent statutes
governing control—Section 9-105 of Article 9, Section 16 of
UETA,129 and Section 7021 of eSign130—is is almost identical
should not prevent the development of systems that respond
to the dierent needs of the transactions with these dierent
types of property items. For example, the conferring of holder
in due course status on a holder of a “transferrable record”
that is to be the equivalent of a holder of a negotiable instrument or negotiable document, with additional benets as
against the obligor, may require a stricter form of control.
But whatever the requirements for control of transferrable
records, the requirements for control of electronic chattel
paper should be sucient for, but no stricter than, what is
necessary to confer the limited quasi-negotiable status to
chattel paper for the limited purposes of such status.
129

See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
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See supra note 112 and accompanying text.

50 © 2014 Thomson Reuters E UCC Law Journal E Vol. 46September 2014

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2561891

